



The Transformation of Migration Governance in Turkey

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INTRODUCTION

Turkey in the last two decades has witnessed important changes at both the domestic and foreign policy levels. Migration governance is a manifest policy area of this transformation. On one hand, with the new law on foreigners and international protection, migration governance in Turkey was institutionalized for the first time under the establishment of the Directorate General of Migration Management, later renamed as the Presidency of Migration Management (hereafter PMM) after 2021. This transformation at the institutional level, i.e., designating a civil

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public institution rather than the police to deal with international migration, came about from an ideological divergence. On the other hand, the massive, rapid, and visible inflow of Syrian refugees following the outbreak of civil war in 2011 redefined the scope and role of migration in Turkey. Within this context, the chapter aims to explain the interactions between the domestic and international factors and the dynamics of these transformations over the past two decades in Turkey's migration history.

Even though migration is not a new phenomenon to Turkish academia, society, and politics, discourse on migration has become a more politicized public topic than ever before. While the rising numbers of foreigners, especially with the arrival of Syrians, has been an important factor in shaping the discourse on migration, there has also been a more ideological transformation. As a contentious domain in politics, migration in Turkey has been largely divided into five broad periods in terms of the migration waves and related scholarly works. The first period, between 1923 and 1950, focused on policies of settlement and citizenship, where scholars explored the transition from an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous demographic structure to a more homogenous one conditioned by "belonging" to the Turkish descent and culture hinging on the Sunni-Turkish identity (Erder, 2018; Kirişci, 2000; Tekeli, 1990). The second period focused on labor migration, especially the Turkish-German migration system, as an emergent trend starting from the 1960s into the present, where the destination countries have multiplied over time (Abadan-Unat, 2002; Kaya & Kentel, 2005). In the third period, Turkey's migration experience in the beginning of the 1980s entered a new phase with the increasing growth of international protection deriving from social and political instabilities in neighboring countries like Iran and Iraq. During this historical phase, the mobility of asylum seekers and refugees gained prominence among scholarly works (Kirişci, 1996, 2000, 2001; Yıldız, 2020; Yıldız & Sert, 2021). The fourth period, separate from the current movements of asylum, began in the 1990s as Turkey started to attract a more diverse categories of migrants, analyzed in the literature under topics such as irregular migration (Ozcurumez & Şenses, 2011), circular migration (İçduygu, 2008), and retirement migration (Balkır & Kırkulak, 2009). The fifth period has started with the crisis in Syria in mid-2011, resulting in the exodus of more than three million Syrian refugees into Turkey, in which scholars explored different aspects including integration (Erdoğan, 2018), their engagement with the job market (Bélanger & Saracoglu, 2020), their

ambiguous legal and social situations (İçduygu & Sert, 2019; Rygiel et al., 2016; Sert & Daniş, 2021), as well as the impact of EU-Turkey relations and externalization policies on Syrians (Karadağ, 2019; Müftüleri-Bac, 2021; Üstübcü, 2017, 2019).

Following this brief account on the past periods of migratory regimes in Turkey, this chapter focuses mainly on the post-2011 period in a descriptive and critical way. It aims to depict how certain changes in the last decade have influenced the transformation in Turkey's migration governance. To do so, the chapter underlines five significant developments in explaining transformation in migration governance: (i) the promulgation of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) in 2013; (ii) the formation of the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), known as the Presidency of Migration Management (hereafter PMM)¹ since October 2021, and Provincial Directorates of Migration Management (PDMM); (iii) the extended scope of Turkish scholarships for international students in higher education institutions since 2012; (iv) the transfer of the UN Refugee Agency's (UNHCR) function in registering asylum applicants and determining refugee status process to the DGMM and PDMMs in September 2018; and (v) the amendments on Turkish Citizenship Law in 2016, 2018, and 2022 to make Turkish citizenship possible for foreigners in return for certain amounts of investments. Hence, the chapter argues that the post-2011 period in Turkey marks two significant transformations in managing international migration. The first is the transformation from institutional and categorical uncertainties into a more state-controlled system through the formation of its own official bureaucracy. In relation to this bureaucratization, the second transformation is the marketization in migration with state-imposed regulations in favor of market logic. Considering the decline in asylum applications vis-à-vis the rise in the number of international students and foreigners purchasing real estate and making investments, this transformation is well underway.

¹ On 29 October 2021, the Directorate General status of the institution was regulated and changed to "Presidency" status, replacing DGMM with officially "T.R. Presidency of Migration Management of the Ministry of Interior". For more information about the status change, please visit <https://en.goc.gov.tr/announcement2> accessed on July 30, 2022. In this paper, the institution will be used as the Presidency of Migration Management (PMM in short).

BUREAUCRATIZATION OF MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

Even though Turkey's reform process in line with the EU *acquis* has largely been frozen, and the EU has lost much of its credibility in Turkey, the migration domain seems to be an exception and its policy alignment has kept its pace with new institutions and new law (Bürgin, 2016). The process of harmonization during the heydays of accession negotiations in the early 2000s did not stop but has instead accelerated in the post-2011 period, including the enactment of new laws and establishment of new institutions. One crucial development during this period is the mass arrival of Syrian refugees, which has facilitated Turkey's institutional and legislative reform process. The existence of hundreds of thousands Syrian refugees in Turkey has become a point of leverage for Turkey to re-open the frozen accession negotiation process, to find ground in accessing funds and resources from the EU, and to harmonize its legislation with the possibility of sharing burden. Then, the new laws and migration bureaucracy can be seen as a continuity of the path that Turkey had entered in the early 2000s with its attempts to harmonize its migration domain. The LFIP is crucial, not only to update Turkey's outdated migration regulations, but also as a cornerstone for the establishment of the PMM as the civilian border and migration bureaucracy in Turkey under the Ministry of Interior (MoI). Turkey has successfully attempted to regulate and institutionalize its international migration and protection policies. Both policies in Turkey's migration governance should be read as a critical juncture beginning with the EU accession process (Icoz & Martin, 2021).

There are some important implications of the LFIP and PMM in Turkey's migration governance. The first implication of the LFIP is the clarification of categorical uncertainties within the legal framework. The new law has clearly defined migrant and asylum-related categories by introducing further categories after the mass inflow of Syrian refugees. To be more precise, Part Three of the LFIP details three international protection types which are refugee (Article 61), conditional refugee (Article 62), and subsidiary protection (Article 63), in addition to the temporary protection category (Article 91). Not only are legal-bureaucratic labels clarified, but also the procedures as well as enumerated rights and responsibilities, including education, health, and work, are clearly explained in it. Another implication is the change in the accountable institution. Prior to the LFIP and PMM, the outdated migration and 1994 asylum regulation

designated the Turkish National Police (TNP) as responsible for dealing with visa proceedings, the registration of asylum applicants, collection of weekly signatures from asylum seekers, and deportation procedures. The accountability transfer to the PMM signals the mentality shift from police scrutiny to the civilian bureaucracy, within which the TNP naturally approached affairs from a security perspective, especially when considering complaints against the violation of non-refoulement principle.

This institutionalization thus illustrates that while there is an ongoing divergence in relations with EU, Turkey has maintained coordination with the EU on the asylum and migration domains. In relation to the EU alignment, these institutional steps suggest a transformation from governing through uncertainty to governing through specialization. This transformation is in line with the transfer of responsibility from police departments to the civil bureaucracy. During the process of transformation, Turkey in its specialization attempts has received greater attention from different international and intergovernmental organizations, including the International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Centre for Migration and Policy Development, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). As Fine (2018) aptly calls the specialization process “bordercratic interventions”, they have participated and wielded their influences during the process by providing guidelines to the new bureaucracy and conducting activities for the new bureaucracy’s capacity building, training of new bureaucrats, the sharing of technical and expert knowledge, and projects, as well as funding and management of funds (Fine, 2018). This exchange can be considered in line with the EU’s externalization policy upon the massive arrivals of Syrian refugees to Turkey. In sum, Turkey’s motivation to access full membership to the EU has created a certain path with the initiation of reform packages in different domains. Reform in migration policies, in accordance with the path offered by the EU accession process, has become the most salient domain in the post-2011 period. This is to say that Turkey’s migration governance has been Europeanized on the one hand. On the other hand, at the EU level, the EU has extended its borders toward a third country, i.e., Turkey, as a part of an externalization policy and external governance (Karadağ, 2019; Müftüler-Bac, 2021). By keeping millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey as safe third country, the utility of the EU’s externalization of its borders to Turkey has thus become effective, especially following the crisis in Syria since mid-2011,

which led millions of Syrians to leave their country. While it has demonstrated that the refugee card is a bargaining tool for Turkey, the march of Syrian refugees to Europe in the summer of 2015 forced the EU member states, particularly Germany, to make a refugee deal with Turkey on March 2016.

Under a climate of deteriorated relations with the EU, the EU-Turkey refugee deal, which is part of the EU's externalized and differential cooperation in certain policy areas with non-member states, has signaled a period of functionalism between both sides (Saatçioğlu, 2020). Accordingly, the March 2016 deal proposed financial aid and visa liberalization for Turkish citizens on the condition of Turkey's revision of its anti-terror law, and progress in membership negotiations. More importantly, it included the bargaining on the resettlement of Syrian refugees to regulate the resettlement of irregular migrants who crossed from Turkey to the Greek islands. The bargain is based on reciprocity, obliging the EU to resettle a Syrian refugee from Turkey in exchange for Turkey's admission of each irregular border crosser from Greek islands (Saatçioğlu, 2020). The march of Syrians toward Europe in the summer of 2015 illustrated that the EU member states, in a hypocritical way, recaptured the importance of Turkey as the EU's strategic partner and a candidate country, while concomitantly in 2016, the European Council announced not to open negotiation chapters upon the alleged backslide of democratization in Turkey.

Following bureaucratization, an important change took place in the context of asylum practices and policies in Turkey. The ratification of the 1951 Geneva Convention and its related protocols was an important juncture in Turkey's asylum regime. To gain legitimacy during the Cold War's ideologically bipolar world, domestic actors in Turkey were therefore willing to admit the recognition and circulation of asylum norms in international and regional politics. The Convention was a significant juncture for Turkey to form a path dependency in its asylum governance by increasing the cooperation between Turkey's Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which opened its Ankara office in 1960. In its original formulation, the 1951 Convention was designed with temporal and geographical limitations in defining refugees, in which it referred to events occurring before 1 January 1951 in the European continent (Yıldız, 2020). The 1967 Additional Protocol, with an inclination to remove these limitations, however, left the decision to remove

or maintain them to the signatory countries. This in turn provided the signatory countries with more latitude in their asylum legislations. While removing the temporal limitation, Turkey maintained the geographical limitation which is still part of Turkey's asylum legislation today. This allows Turkey to grant refugee status to asylum applicants from European countries; however, non-European asylum applicants, upon recognition of their application, are recognized as non-convention refugees who can stay in the country until their resettlement to conventional third countries like the United States, Canada, and Australia (Yıldız, 2020). At the time, this preference stemmed from the fact that almost no asylum applicant from non-European countries arrived in Turkey until the end of the 1970s.

Events such as the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Saddam Hussein's use of violence against Iraqi Kurds in late 1980s, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2001 produced hundreds of thousands non-European refugees who fled their countries of origin and arrived in Turkey to seek asylum and international protection, albeit with no chance of obtaining refugee status. While these asylum seekers are still allowed to remain in Turkey until the commencement of their resettlement to a third country, imposing geographical limitations on non-European asylum applicants has created a binary asylum system in which the UNHCR has become the responsible institution for registration, status determination, and coordination of the resettlement process (Kirişci, 1996, 2001). In this binary system, both Turkey's MoI and the UNHCR conducted registration while UNHCR decides who is to be recognized as refugees or not. Another repercussion of the UNHCR's accountability in this process is that Turkey came to adopt a governing through uncertainty and irresponsibility rationale in dealing with its non-European asylum applicants (Biehl, 2015; Sert & Yıldız, 2016). Until the formation of the official migration bureaucracy, Turkey evaded responsibility in both the refugee status determination and resettlement processes. If something were to go wrong in their application, the UNHCR, not Turkey's MoI, was seen as the institution to blame (Yıldız, 2020). Governing through uncertainty in Turkey's asylum governance has been closely linked to the geographical limitation practice, ambiguities in Turkey's regulations in legal and social rights of asylum applicants, and temporal ambiguities during the stay of asylum seekers in Turkey.

MARKETIZATION IN MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

Developments in Turkey's migration governance have not been limited to the enactment of more Europeanized migration law and the establishment of civilian bureaucracy. Turkey has importantly realized the economic dimension of migration in the post-2011 period. It has introduced new policy agendas in accordance with market priorities and neoliberalized its migration governance. Citizenship-by-investment is one of the relatively new migration categories, with this group's numbers increasingly significantly every year as individuals purchase real estate in Turkey. It is also a new category which reflects the expansion of market logic into the migration domain. This category is at the outset related to the Turkish Citizenship Law (5901) and its implementation through the Regulation on the Implementation of the Turkish Citizenship Law, which came into force in 2010 (2010/139). The Regulation prescribes not only the implementation of citizenship services, but also the acquisition and loss of Turkish citizenship. Article 20 of the Regulation on the exceptional acquisition of Turkish Citizenship was amended in 2016 with the decision signed by the President, coming into force on 12 January 2017 (decree number: 2016/9061).

The Presidential Decree, which has been revised and amended in 2018 and 2022, has been the first detailed regulation that amends the citizenship-capital nexus in Turkey. Accordingly, the 2016 Regulation determined the methods and financial figures for the acquisition of exceptional Turkish citizenship status: (a) at least \$2 million of fixed capital investment in Turkey; (b) at least \$1 million in real estate purchase(s) with the condition of not selling for three years; (c) the creation of employment opportunities for at least 100 persons; (d) at least \$3 million of deposits to be held in Turkish Banks with the condition of holding for three years; and, (e) at least \$3 million of purchases of state debt instruments with the condition of holding for three years. On 5 May 2017, a new regulation (2017/10008) came into force, adding a new clause: (f) at least \$1.5 million in the creation of real estate investment trusts or venture capital funds with the condition of holding for three years.

The 2017 Regulation was further revised in September 2018 with a Presidential decree (Decree 106, on 19 September 2018) which reduced the amounts significantly: specifically, the clause (a) reduced the amount from \$2 million to \$500,000 or an equivalent amount of foreign

exchange or Turkish Lira; (b) from \$1 million to \$250,000 or an equivalent amount of foreign exchange or Turkish Lira; (c) from 100 persons to 50; (d) from \$3 million to \$500,000 or an equivalent amount of foreign exchange or Turkish Lira; (e) from \$3 million to \$500,000 or an equivalent amount of foreign exchange or Turkish Lira; and the clause (f) was changed to ‘at least \$500,000’ or an equivalent amount of foreign exchange or Turkish Lira. The final change regarding the Regulation was recently published in January 2022 (Decree 5072, on 5 January 2022). It changed the name of institutions which are responsible in implementing and evaluating the process. One reason for this change is that as in the case of clause (e) regarding state debt instruments, responsibility has been transferred from the Undersecretariat of Treasury to the Ministry of Treasury and Finance. Moreover, the new decree removed the “equivalent amount of Turkish Lira” expression from each clause.

Then, how can we interpret the emergence and changes related to the acquisition of exceptional Turkish citizenship? It is firstly related to what Adamson and Tsouparas (2020) call the neoliberal migration state, in which states tend to increase the capitalization of their cross-border mobility to create revenue from migration through the marketization of some migration categories. In essence, this global trend relates to the commodification of citizenship. In the expansion of this process to different national contexts, commodification has been made easier by the flexibility and arbitrariness of neoliberal policies, in which the state’s regulatory role benefits from this flexibility to function in favor of market logic (see Yağcı in this volume). Thus, by noticing the importance of the revenue-generating potential of migration, Turkey has taken concrete steps toward the commodification of citizenship. With the decision to introduce such a regulatory framework to create a market for citizenship, domestic actors have officially formed a migration trajectory which was absent in the Turkish migration context. More importantly, the introduction of new norms and the subsequent formation of this migration path have impacted the preferences of some migrants. As this category requires certain amounts of investment, not all migrants can participate in this migration form. Participation in citizenship-by-investment migration by some migrants proves the ability of neoliberalization to create new forms of hierarchies within the context of mobility. This suggests the transformation of the notion of citizenship which, in a normative way, had the ability to create a community of equals in a territorial nation-state by confirming the higher position of citizens over foreigners in their

localized hierarchy. Citizenship-by-investment challenges the basis of such conceptions of citizenship by diminishing the classical national-foreigner hierarchical relation at the domestic level, and by concomitantly reproducing new hierarchical relations at the global level (Joppke, 2019). In other words, the rich have a chance to live anywhere with the opportunity to obtain citizenship status in any country.

Going back to the question of how this policy choice impacts the preferences of some migrants, it is useful to provide some data on real estate purchases by foreigners in Turkey. Real estate sales to foreigners have significantly increased since 2016 following the Regulation and its several amendments regarding exceptional acquisition of Turkish citizenship. According to TURKSTAT data, while around 12 thousand foreigners purchased real estate in Turkey in 2013, the number reached 18 thousand in 2016. The trend of real estate has continued to grow by reaching 40 thousand in 2018 and 58 thousand in 2021. In terms of the provincial preferences of foreigners in real estate purchases, metropolitan cities like Istanbul and Ankara, and the coastal cities like Antalya, Yalova, Mersin, and Bursa demonstrated larger increases in the sales. To put it concretely, the number of foreigners purchasing real estate in Istanbul has risen from 2,447 in 2013 to 25,469 in 2021. For the same years, it has risen from 175 to 3,672 in Ankara, and from 5,548 to 12,384 in Antalya. In addition to these cities, over the last two years, the number of foreigners purchasing real estate in Izmir is increasing as well: while foreigners purchased 908 real estate assets in 2020, sales in 2021 reached 1,411 in Turkey's third largest city. Table 10.1 illustrates TURKSTAT data on the real estate purchases by foreigners by countries, showing the overall increase from 2015 to 2022, especially in the numbers of Iraqi and Iranian individuals purchasing real estate.

Table 10.1 demonstrates that change in institutional settings and policy agendas shapes not only the behaviors of actors but also the preferences of individuals. What we see in the post-2011 period is that policy shifts have impacted their preferences by assigning citizenship-by-investment as an alternative migration category in their mobility to Turkey. In other words, regulatory change renders cognitive templates for individual actors who, at the micro level, reconfigure and reorient their migratory preferences, in this case, of mobility toward Turkey under the citizenship-by-investment category. This reflects what historical institutionalists have underlined (Hall & Taylor, 1996, 937), that changes in policy agendas play a greater

Table 10.1 Real estate purchases by foreigners by countries (2015–2022)

<i>Nationality</i>	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Iran	744	664	792	3652	5423	7189	10,056
Iraq	4228	3036	3805	8205	7596	6674	8661
Russia	2036	1224	1331	2297	2893	3078	5379
Afghanistan	656	1205	1078	2084	2191	1929	2762
Azerbaijan	815	610	942	1250	1191	1279	1517
Saudi Arabia	2704	1886	3345	2718	2208	679	–
Germany	869	714	772	1866	1723	1265	2358
Kazakhstan	540	380	334	542	776	1171	2090
United Kingdom	1054	827	794	1237	1353	1126	1089
Kuwait	2130	1744	1691	2199	1903	1231	1791
Other countries	3514	3067	3638	6899	8802	7542	11,370

Source TURKSTAT, <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Kategori/GetKategori?p=in%C5%9Faat-ve-konut-116&dil=1>, last accessed on 25 February 2022. The data is compiled by the authors

role ‘in structuring collective behavior’, as seen in the steady rise in numbers of Iraqi and Iraqi individuals purchasing property in Izmir.

The regulation making citizenship into a market good in Turkey is also related to the financial turmoil that the country has been experiencing in recent years. This is to say that Turkey’s initiation to amend the exceptional acquisition of Turkish citizenship has a practical and functional motivation. The motivation lies at the heart of the AKP’s policy priority to support investments in the construction industry by subsequently driving the real estate sector as an engine for the economy (see Yağcı in this volume). After the economic crisis in 2001 led the AKP to be the ruling party, the construction sector has become the sixth largest sector in Turkey (Erol & Unal, 2015). At the macro level, Turkey initiated several reforms after the 2001 crisis: first, it financialized the real estate market by regulating a mortgage system for middle- and upper-income groups, and second, it adopted state-led urban gentrification projects (Erol, 2019). Both steps increased the importance of the construction sector and real estate market, as well as these sectors’ impacts on Turkey’s economic growth in general. While neoliberal structural reforms from 2001 to 2008 had a significant impact on appreciating the Turkish Lira by around seventy percent while simultaneously increasing external debt, Turkey began to experience instability problems including unemployment, inflation, and the payment of external debts after the second half of

2010 (Orhangazi & Yeldan, 2021). Since August 2018, Turkey's growth has slowed down significantly, and its credit ratings were downgraded due to declining foreign capital flows and a burgeoning currency crisis (Orhangazi & Yeldan, 2021). Therefore, amendments in the citizenship-by-investment category are not distinct from Turkey's ongoing currency and debt crisis. Introduction of this migration category and related amendments since 2016 should be then considered along with the value loss of the Turkish Lira and crises in both the real estate market and construction sector. This suggests that Turkish officials have just noticed the functional and practical role of the institution of citizenship as a profit-making venue. By accommodating a citizenship-by-investment migration category into the Turkish migration governance, they seek to find at least a temporary remedy against the decline in foreign capital flows and to balance the value loss of the Turkish Lira vis-à-vis increasing capital outflows. Thus, these regulations in turn have increased the commodification of citizenship in favor of market preferences and prioritizing the real estate and construction sectors.

Neoliberal policies have also become effective in the commodification of higher education. The transformation of higher education to a sort of a private-sector industry is also a part of global trend. The developed countries, like the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, began initially to adopt policies and initiatives to attract international students through state and university-level marketing and branding activities (Findlay et al., 2017). In general, studies examining international student mobility highlight the internationalization of higher education institutions by mainly focusing on the social and cultural reasons in this migration category (Bilecen, 2014; Brooks & Waters, 2011). Moreover, the literature discusses the financial benefits of student mobility for both the host countries and their universities within the framework of education-migration industry (Baas, 2019; Haussen & Uebelmesser, 2016). From the 1970s onward, through regulations like visa facilitations and permanent residency opportunities, countries including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have begun to be attractive new centers for international students, aside from the countries that had previously occupied that position such as the United States and the United Kingdom (Baas, 2019).

In the case of Turkey, international student mobility has two main reasons: one is the commodification of education to generate income, and the second reason, as briefly discussed below, is part of Turkey's public

diplomacy initiation, as stated in the 2018 Regulation of Turkey Scholarships. Higher education as a commodity and market good is indeed a recent phenomenon with the eased and expedited conditions during the registration process to Turkish universities. This suggests that in addition to the citizenship-by-investment category, neoliberalization in Turkey's migration governance can also be observable in the domain of international student mobility. Historically, the country started to admit international students through the Foreign Student Exam (YOS) in 1981 but the number of incoming students remained very limited due to the absence of scholarships until the early 1990s. While the first systematic international student policy was introduced under the Özal Presidency in 1992 with a project called the "Great Student Project", the Turkey Scholarships program became effective and systematic in 2012. With the Great Student Project, new entrance exams for international students were introduced, such as the Turkish and Relative Communities Examination (TCS), and fellowship opportunities were extended. As a result, the number of international students from Azerbaijan and Turkic countries, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, began to increase significantly, reaching 35,000 in 2012 (Kiroğlu et al., 2010; Yılmaz et al., 2016). However, the turning point has been the introduction of new scholarships under the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) in 2012, which as in Table 10.2 illustrates resulted in the increase of both the diversity and the number of international students in Turkish universities.

Table 10.2 clearly indicates that there is a constant increase in the number of international undergraduate students in Turkey from Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Turkmenistan, Somalia, and Syria. The main reason behind the rise of international undergraduate students is that many state universities in Turkey do not require an entrance exam for them, and they can apply only through their high school transcripts, even though registration to some departments like Medical Schools and Engineering Departments are still conditional upon certain exams, including the YOS exam and/or international exams like the SAT.

What makes international student mobility an industry is the adjustment of tuition fees in accordance with the reputation and location of the university. It should be noted that tuition is free for Turkish undergraduate students who enroll in any state university. However, for a foreign student enrolling in the Faculty of Medicine at Ankara University, the tuition for the 2021–2022 education year is 40,000 Turkish Liras, and for

Table 10.2 International undergraduate students in Turkey (2015–2021)

Nationality	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021
Azerbaijan	6901	10,638	12,504	14,878	17,088	19,383	21,069	23,770
Iran	4343	5302	5661	6099	6418	7154	8776	11,223
Iraq	1585	3033	4414	5012	5187	7608	9752	14,799
Afghanistan	2332	3672	4338	5251	5826	6804	7517	8428
Turkmenistan	6941	9092	9903	10,418	12,247	17,571	18,016	19,384
Somalia	638	915	1383	1735	2310	3764	6104	8141
Syria	1785	5560	9589	15,042	20,701	27,034	37,236	47,482

Source: YOK, istatistik.yok.gov.tr, last accessed March 2022. The data is compiled by the authors

the English as the instruction language, it is 60,000 Turkish Liras. This amount is same for the foreign students who enroll in School of Medicine at Istanbul University, in which while the tuition for the 2020–2021 education year was 30,000 TL, it is 40,000 for the 2021–2022 education year. For the Medicine and Engineering Departments, the applications are competitive, and applicants are more selective in comparison to the Social and Humanitarian Science departments. This selectiveness and competition have led universities and some departments to require exams for registration (exams including AYÖS [Ankara University Foreign Students Exam], or SAT). It would be useful to also provide an example from social science departments. For instance, while the tuition for the Faculty of Law at Ankara University is 13,200 TL, it is 8800 TL for the Faculty of Political Science for the programs of which the instruction language is Turkish. Another point to be raised is that the fees can also change based on the popularity of the city and recognition level of the university. For instance, tuition for a foreign student enrolling to the Faculty of Social Sciences at Aksaray University is 4200 TL, which is one of the lowest tuitions among Turkish state universities.

As stated before, Turkey's initiation to attract foreign students has been systematically institutionalized since 2012 with the formation of the Turkey Scholarships Program under coordination of the YTB established in 2010. Turkey Scholarships is a government-sponsored and state-funded higher education scholarship program for undergraduate and graduate level international students. Numbers provided by the Turkey Scholarships and YTB websites portray the increasing numbers of foreign students enrolling higher education, hence proving the success of the initiative to attract foreign students. According to the statistics of Turkey Scholarships, while 40,000 foreign students applied to Turkey Scholarships in 2012, the number of applications reached at 165,000 in 2021. According to the YTB website, Turkey hosts nearly 110,000 international students, of which 25,000 are benefiting from the Turkey Scholarships program. Upon the applicants' eligibility and success in an interview, the scholarship covers tuition fees, free Turkish language course for one year, accommodation, flight tickets, health insurance, and a monthly stipend.²

² 1000 TL for undergraduate; 1400 TL for masters; and 1800 TL for PhD level. For more information, visit turkey scholarships and <https://www.ytb.gov.tr/en/international-students/turkey-scholarships>.

One reason to attract international students is the neoliberalization of Turkey's migration by transforming education into a market and industry, as the Global North has done for years. Another reason for Turkey's policy to attract international students to the country is public diplomacy. In understanding whether Turkey's intention is to attract successful students by accommodating and keeping them in the Turkish labor market or to attract them purely through a market logic motivation, we have conducted several unofficial meetings. Accordingly, YTB's main motivation is not to include international students into Turkey's labor market upon their graduation. The YTB encourages students to return to their country when they graduate and provides scholarship for mostly international students who are not planning to stay in Turkey. As the 2018 Regulation of Turkey Scholarship (Official Gazette: 30,497) asserts, the aim is to strengthen the social, political, and economic bonds and interactions through international students who register in Turkish universities. Also, it is clearly stated that the scholarship program aims to enhance diplomatic relations, and support Turkey's internationalization effort by pursuing public diplomacy.

CONCLUSION

The Chapter has focused on the post-2011 developments leading to the neoliberal transformation of Turkey's migration governance. The period is significant not just due to the eruption of the crisis in Syria in 2011 and the subsequent arrival of thousands of Syrian refugees to the country, but this period is also critical in terms of the institutionalization and changes in policy preferences in the migration domain. In understanding this transformation, the chapter has begun with the historical context of asylum-related migration to Turkey, the dominant form since the early 1980s. At the institutional and legislative level, Turkey's reform attempts were facilitated in the early 2000s through its willingness to be a full member of the EU. These initiatives, accelerated with the mass arrivals of Syrian refugees, materialized through the developments in the post-2011 period when Turkey introduced its new migration law (LFIP) and civilian bureaucracy (PMM). Therefore, the chapter claims that Turkey maintained policy alignment with the EU instead of de-Europeanization in migration domain, even though the country still maintains the geographical limitation in its asylum legislation.

The chapter articulates that both institutional and legislative reforms are significant in terms of the changing rationale in Turkey's migration governance, in which the post-2011 period witnessed rising volumes in the citizenship-by-investment and international student mobility migration categories. As these capital-intensified migration categories recently blossomed in Turkey, their rise directly derives from regulations related to these categories initiated during this period. Turkey's efforts to increase the volume of capital heavy migration categories are closely related to the country's financial turmoil, decline in foreign capital flows, and currency crisis. While the citizenship-by-investment category commodifies the notion of citizenship in accordance with the 2016 Regulation amending the exceptional acquisition of Turkish citizenship, the flexibility delegated to higher education institutions in determining admission of international students has led to the rise of international students as higher education has become commodified. In other words, new regulations have led to the neoliberal transformation of Turkey's migration governance by commodifying both citizenship and higher education in line with market logic.

Finally, the chapter demonstrated that the increasing numbers in both migration categories indicate the importance of policy choices to shape and impact the preferences of migrants and migratory trajectories. Turkey's regulations in the migration domain demonstrated that while policy makers can be instrumental and functionalist in their decision to initiate new policies, the preferences of migrants are modified through instrumental reasoning in deciding to participate in citizenship-by-investment and/or international student mobility. Changes in institutional settings and policy preferences commodifying citizenship and higher education in the post-2011 period have led Turkey to enter a neoliberal path in its migration governance by prioritizing the demands of the market.

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