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***Making a Case over Greco-Turkish Rivalry:  
Major Power Linkages and Rivalry Strength***

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# Making a Case over Greco-Turkish Rivalry: Major Power Linkages and Rivalry Strength

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## ABSTRACT

The goal of the paper is to explore how the intensity of the Greco-Turkish rivalry (in the 19th and 20th centuries) was affected by variation in the intensity of rivalries between major powers that have political and military connections to Greece and Turkey. By comparing the effect of relevant major power rivalries with a battery of alternative domestic, dyadic, military, and political variables, the article serves as a deductive evaluation to see how important, if at all, variation in the volatility of intensity of the relevant major power rivalries is on the Greek-Turkish rivalry intensity volatility.

**Keywords:** Greece, Turkey, Rivalry, Linkage, Intensity, Major Power

## Türk-Yunan Rekabeti Üzerine Vaka Analizi: Büyük Güçler Bağlantısı ve Rekabet Direnci

## ÖZET

Bu makalenin amacı, Türk-Yunan rekabetinin (19. ve 20. yüzyıllarda) yoğunluğunun, Yunanistan ve Türkiye ile siyasi ve askeri bağlantıları olan büyük güçler arasındaki rekabetin yoğunluğundan nasıl etkilendiğini araştırmaktır. Her iki yüzyılda da, Türk-Yunan rekabeti, bağlantılarında ne doğrudan rekabet mekanizmaları ile tam olarak ilişkilendirilen, ne de hiyerarşik üstün rekabete dayandırılan bir vaka örneğidir. Yine de, bu türden bağlantılardan tamamen ayrı da sayılamaz. İlgili büyük güç rekabetlerinin alternatif yerel, ikili, askeri ve politik değişkenler ile karşılaştırılmasıyla, makale, ilgili büyük güç çekişmelerinin yoğunluğundaki değişimin Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde ne kadar önemli olduğunu görmek için tümdengelimsel bir değerlendirme işlevi görmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Yunanistan, Türkiye, Rekabet, Bağlantı, Yoğunluk, Büyük Güçler

## Introduction

Greek-Turkish relations have been a popular topic of interest, attracting academic attention from a variety of disciplines within humanities and social sciences. Every decade, the affairs between the two countries generate fresh areas for discussion besides the already existing ones. Among the themes are Turkey's ongoing accession process into the European Union, NATO, the Cyprus issue, the Aegean Islands dispute, and as of 2015, the refugee crisis. Recently, repeated disputes in the Aegean Sea, caused alarm among commentators about a possible Greek-Turkish war.<sup>1</sup> In general, Greek-Turkish relations have been a prevalent focus of concentration and there are numerous studies concerning the Greco-Turkish rivalry.<sup>2</sup>

Rivalry is employed here as a condition of enmity between two states characterized by the frequent use of either military force or images of enmity. As argued elsewhere, social scientific studies indicate that Greece and Turkey can be regarded in this condition of enmity, which has had a pervasive impact on the way public opinion in both countries perceive everything and anything, including for example, the current refugee crisis in the region.<sup>3</sup>

While some scholars focus on opportunities to break the cycle of rivalry and others focus on the directionality of activity,<sup>4</sup> there is also a tendency to bypass the antagonistic bilateral relationship between Greece and Turkey by concentrating on their multilateral interactions at the regional level or the rapprochement process.<sup>5</sup> When it comes to factors driving a rivalry, a robust debate on the interrelationship between Greek and Turkish military expenditures in the post-World War II era has not been able to settle on whether there is an arms race between the two states. Some scholars have found indicators supporting the arguments on the presence of an arms race.<sup>6</sup> Others argue that statistical data does not support such a view.<sup>7</sup> However, the scholarship on rivalries has shown that

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- 1 Y. Baboulias, "Greece and Turkey are inching towards war", *Foreign Policy*, 18 April 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/18/greece-and-turkey-are-inching-toward-war/> (Accessed on 23 April 2018); P. Kingsley, "Tiny Islands Make for Big Tensions between Greece and Turkey", *New York Times*, 21 April 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/21/world/europe/greece-turkey-islands.html?smid=tw-share> (Accessed on 23 April 2018).
  - 2 M. Stephen, *The Cyprus Question: A Concise Guide to the History, Politics, and Law of the Cyprus Question*, Northgate, 2001; M. Aydın and K. Ifantis, *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean*, London, Routledge, 2004; F. Moustakis, *The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO*, London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003; A. Çarkoglu & B. Rubin (Eds.), *Greek-Turkish Relations in an era of Détente*, Oxford, Routledge, 2005; Krebs, R. R., "Perverse institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish conflict", *International Organization*, Vol.53, No.2, 1999, p.343-377; Z. Tziarras, "Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East under the AKP (2002-2013): A Neoclassical Realist Account", Unpublished Dissertation, University of Warwick, 2014.
  - 3 See K. Travlos, "Narratives within Rivalry: Greek popular views on the refugee crisis", *Turkish Review*, Vol.6, No.3, 2016, p. 148-150.
  - 4 K. Kirişci, "The 'Enduring Rivalry' Between Greece and Turkey: Can 'Democratic Peace' Break It?", *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol.1, No.1, 2002, p.38-50.
  - 5 O. Anastasakis, "Greece and Turkey in the Balkans: Cooperation or Rivalry?", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.5, No.1, 2004, p.45-60; G. Koukoudakis, "Explaining the Endurance of Greek-Turkish Rapprochement Process", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol.11, No.44 (Winter 2015), p.81-100.
  - 6 C. Kollias, "The Greek-Turkish Conflict and Greek Military Expenditure 1960-92", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.19, No.33, 1996, p.217-228; İ. Aktar and A. Civan, "Is there any cointegration between Turkey's and Greece's Military Expenditures?", *Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol.21, 2015, from <http://dergipark.gov.tr/dpusbe/issue/4763/65447>, (Accessed on 23 April 2018).
  - 7 G. M. Georgiou et al., "Modelling Greek-Turkish Rivalry: An Empirical Investigation of Defense Spending Dynamics", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.33, No.2, 1996, p.229-239.

even in the absence of arms races, there may be other strategic, political, and economic factors that sustain the rivalry.<sup>8</sup>

One such explanation considers the non-resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict not as a matter of the incompatibility of tangible interests, but rather as a result of their chosen national identities cum historical narratives, which are built on slighting and demonizing the “other”.<sup>9</sup> Comparing Greek-Turkish interstate crises to different cases, others claim that nuclear weapons and regional organizations have been important elements of possible escalation or mitigation of the conflict.<sup>10</sup> There are also studies that run a simulation between Greece and Turkey within a system dynamic model in order to understand why countries go to war, why internal violence occurs, and how internal and external conflicts might be interconnected or give rise to common dynamics or dilemmas.<sup>11</sup>

Within this extensive and rather complementary ground of argumentation, the goal of our paper is to explore how the intensity of the Greco-Turkish rivalry (in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries) was affected by variation in the intensity of rivalries between major powers that have political and military connections to Greece and Turkey. In both centuries, the Greek-Turkish rivalries are exemplar cases of rivalries that are neither fully enmeshed into direct rivalry linkages through alliances nor nested in hierarchical superior rivalries. Yet, they are also not completely isolated from such links. By comparing the effect of relevant major power rivalries with a battery of alternative domestic, dyadic, military, and political variables, the article serves as a deductive evaluation to see how important, if at all, variation in the volatility of intensity of the relevant major power rivalries is on the Greek-Turkish rivalry intensity volatility. While doing so, the article also contributes to the theoretical discussion on rivalry linkages as outlined below.

## Theoretical Discussion and Contribution

Rivalries were born out of, or end from, a political shock, which could take place at a *domestic* (from events in the internal politics of rivals), *dyadic* (in the relationships between rivals), or *international* (structural) level.<sup>12</sup> On the *domestic* level, such events include abrupt government changes due to revolutions or coups, rapid democratization, or the onset of civil war in one of the two rivals. These constitute the most likely events to shock a rivalry into termination. Economic events that lead to massive economic changes, either with a collapse of, or with an abrupt increase in, state finances can also cause such a shock.

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8 J. P. Klein *et al.*, “The new rivalry dataset: Procedures and patterns”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.43, No.3, 2006, p.331-348; More specifically, see, N. Loizides, *The politics of majority nationalism: Framing peace, stalemates, and crises*, Stanford University Press, 2015; A. Suzuki, *Nationalism, rivalry, and revisionist state behavior: A new theory and empirics in the post-WWII era*. PhD Dissertation, Dublin City University, 2015.

9 A. Heraclides, “What will become of us without barbarians? The enduring Greek–Turkish rivalry as an identity-based conflict”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.12, No.1, 2012, p.115-134.

10 A. Suzuki and N. Loizides, “Escalation of interstate crises of conflictual dyads: Greece-Turkey and India-Pakistan”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol.46, No.1, 2011, p.21-39.

11 M. A. Öner *et al.*, “Understanding the Interactions between International and Domestic Conflicts: The Case of Turkey and Greece”, *JETAS*, Vol.1, No.2, 2013, p.119-150; C. You, “Explaining the Maintenance Process of International Rivalries: A Modified Two-Level Game Approach to the Maintenance of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Greco-Turkish Rivalry, 1958-2001”, *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Vol.14, No.1, 2016, p.131-159.

12 P. F. Diehl and G. Goertz, *War and Peace in International Rivalry*, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 2001.

Shocks on the *dyadic* level include military disputes and wars, subsumed in the rivalry definition, as well as conditions such as the advent of joint democracy, the contemporaneity of domestic political upheaval, power transition, shared IGO memberships, or shared alliance membership that can act in inhibiting or fostering ways for variation in rivalry volatility. The *international*, i.e. structural, level focuses on world wars, during which the dynamics of linked major power rivalries could also affect the dynamics of the minor power rivalries they were linked to. With a larger focus on rivalry onset and termination as opposed to conflict dynamics during a rivalry, among the three levels, international events have less of an impact on rivalry conflict dynamics compared to other factors that rise at the domestic or dyadic level.

In any case, each rivalry onset is met with a shock that leads to initial conflict and locks in a Basic Rivalry Level (BRL hereafter) of intensity, which then remains stable. BRL is based on the use of the Correlates of War (COW hereafter) Severity scores of the individual disputes that constitute the rivalry.<sup>13</sup> The BRL of a rivalry is determined by the severity of the dispute that led to the initiation of the rivalry. Any variation in intensity follows a punctuated equilibrium model in which new disputes could lead to increases or decreases of intensity compared to the BRL. However, if those disputes do not shock the rivalry into termination, the increase or decrease of severity compared to the BRL will only be temporary.<sup>14</sup> There has been very little research on how variation of intensity around the BRL, the volatility of a rivalry's intensity, is affected by the volatility of other rivalries.

BRL could be affected by linkages with other rivalries, in which events or changing dynamics in the intensity of one rivalry could affect the intensity of another; a process different from war diffusion. There are two types of linkages: direct and indirect. The *former* refers to those rivalries linked due to the existence of common disputes in which members of different rivalries engage. To illustrate, during World War I, the British-German rivalry was linked with the Ottoman-Russian rivalry since *all* were participants in the (greater) conflict. A direct linkage can also be the result of an alliance or of patron-client relations across the rivalries when members of one rivalry are connected to members of the other.<sup>15</sup>

The *latter*, indirect linkage, is a result of two different conditions, namely contiguity and the presence of a common enemy. Contiguity refers to situations in which two rivalries are linked because members of the two different rivalries are territorially contiguous to each other. In the case of common enemy linkage, the two rivalries are linked because members of each rivalry share a common enemy outside the two rivalries. The Greek-Turkish and Greek-Bulgarian rivalry can be linked because of

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13 It is important to note that the interstate rivalry perspective we take here focuses on instances of a militarized interstate dispute (MID), as operationalized by the COW, as the backbone of rivalry interactions. This does not mean that we discount in general the importance of non-state and intra-state activity that interacts with the inter-state rivalry, but here we do take the position that state actors, and especially decision makers, have a flexibility to choose which non-state and intra-state activity they will internationalize via a MID and which they will not. Thus, intra-state incidents like the 1955 Istanbul Pogroms, or non-state incidents like the inter-communal violence in Cyprus before 1958 can feed the construction of enemy images, but such images only become relevant to the interstate rivalry when they lead to MIDs. The primacy or equality of non-state and intra-state incidents to MIDs is something more appropriate to civilizational or cultural conceptions of communal rivalry. Ours is a more state-centric framework. We cannot ignore the ability of decision makers to pick and choose what issues they will militarize at the interstate level. Many communities have images of enmity with each other, but not all such images lead to inter-state rivalry. Thus, here we remain within the MID approach to rivalry intensity.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

Greece's participation in both. This is different from linkage by dispute in which the rivalries share no common members, but all of their members are participants in a conflict.<sup>16</sup>

This may be the case for nested rivalries, where rivalries happen because a rivalry between two hierarchically superior actors produces a shock leading to rivalry between two hierarchically inferior actors, with the classical example of Cold War rivalries that were the result of the United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR hereafter) and the United States (USA hereafter) rivalry. There is a hierarchy of rivalry linkages based on international prestige and power, where major power rivalries have more of an impact in linkage than asymmetrical rivalries. The analysis of the impact of rivalry linkages shows that contiguity and participation in the same dispute were more likely to lead to increases in BRL intensity for one rivalry when such an increase similarly took place in the other.<sup>17</sup>

Rivalries can also be seen as a system of war diffusion resulting in band-wagon dynamics as rival dyad members enter the war following rivalries with which they share linkages.<sup>18</sup> Diffusion can be contagious and hierarchical across both a spatial and social network of relationships and linkages. A recent review of the rivalry literature adapted and applied the “steps to war” conceptual framework to the onset of rivalries.<sup>19</sup> Based on this analysis, the Greek-Turkish rivalries lacked alliances as a crucial step to rivalry – although the Ottoman Empire had alliances in 1866, Greece did not.

Literature on rivalry has rarely revisited the question of linkage dynamics.<sup>20</sup> There is focus on complex rivalries, which are non-dyadic rivalries where strong links along issue, concerns, and alignments lead to strong joiner dynamics. The crucial difference between linked rivalries and complex rivalries are the stronger likelihoods of the third rival joining any conflict of the two other rivals in the latter. Rivalry linkages are not always as strong, but in time, linked rivalries can turn into complex rivalries. Complex rivalries are a sub-category of more intense rivalry linkages.<sup>21</sup>

We propose two types of linkage dynamics: “oppositional” and “regulatory”. In the former case (see Figure I), each of the rivals in one rivalry is linked with only one of the opposing sides in the other rivalry. In such cases, an increase in conflict volatility in one can lead to increases in volatility in the other, as the feuding allies or confederates in one rivalry can take advantage of conflict in the other to pursue their enmity. A major power rival may increase pressure on its minor power ally to join the major power dispute by directly attacking the major power's rival. The other major power rival, in order to preclude or deny such assistance, might pressure the remaining minor power rival to attack the other major power's minor ally. The fact that major powers are in conflict might make their elites and winning coalitions more willing to supply minor power rivals with material, financial, and military support in order to make them engage in conflict.

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16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 C. Flint *et al.*, “The conflict space of cataclysm: the international system and the spread of war 1914–1917”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol.7, No.2, 2011, p.143-168.


19 B. Valeriano, “Becoming Rivals”, John A. Vasquez (Ed.) *What do we know about war*, New York, NY, Rowman & Littlefield, 2012, p.63-82.

20 For rare examples, see Klein *et al.*; P. F. Diehl and G. Goertz, “The rivalry process: how rivalries are sustained and terminated”, John A. Vasquez (Ed.) *What do we know about war*, New York, NY, Rowman & Littlefield, 2012, p.83-109; S. Akcinaroglu *et al.*, “The Effects of Rivalry on Rivalry: Accommodation and the Management of Threats”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol.10, No.1, 2014, p.81–100; B. Valeriano and M. Powers, “Complex Interstate Rivals”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol.12, No.4, 2016, p.552-570.


21 Ibid.

Similarly, domestic dynamics may lead minor power rivals to seek support from the major power rivals when those major powers are in conflict by presenting such support as part of the major power's own effort to defeat its rival. Indeed, increased intervention by one major power in the minor power rivalry may lead to a reaction of the other major power, creating a condition in which volatility in the minor power rivalry fosters volatility in the major power rivalry. In such circumstances, conflict in one rivalry creates an environment with windows of opportunity for increased material and financial military support that can be used to fuel conflict in the other rivalry. These are "oppositional linkages" (OPL hereafter), since the two rivalries are linked along opposition lines.

**Figure I: Oppositional Linkage**



**Figure II: Regulatory Linkage**



In the case of "regulatory linkage" (RL hereafter) (see Figure II), the two minor power rivals share [common] links with only one of the major power rivals, or both of them share links with each major power rival. In this case the volatility linkage works differently than in the case of OPL. The fact that both minor power rivals are dependents, or allies, of the same major power creates incentives for the major power to engage in managerial regulation of their conflict. When there is an increased chance of conflict between the two rivals, the major power patron/s are more likely to intervene to defuse the situation, because conflict among the minor power rivals may tarnish the international prestige of the major power, or force it to choose among them, creating a new enemy.

Major powers would much prefer to keep things under control by denying financial and material military support to the two rivals, threatening abandonment, and sometimes by direct action. However, this managerial regulation becomes strained when the major power becomes embroiled in intensification of its own rivalry. This creates a window of opportunity for the minor power rivals to attempt to resolve their differences despite the wishes of the major power patron. Thus, we argue that in the case of RL, increases in the volatility of the major power rivalry will be associated with increases in the volatility of the minor power rivalry.

An example of RL is the relationship between the Serbo-Bulgarian rivalry and the Russo-Austrian one in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. After the 1903 Karadjordjevic coup in Serbia and until 1913, Serbia and Bulgaria were both dominated by pro-Russian elites. However, they also were rivals for territories of the Ottoman Empire. Their common alignment with Russia meant that Russia acted as a regulator in their conflict. However, when Russia and Austria were engaged in intense conflict, Serbia and Bulgaria could pursue their rivalry without the conflict-dampening influence of Russia.

Accordingly, this paper contributes to the literature on three major points. *First*, by revisiting the question of linkage dynamics, it extends recent research on rivalry. *Second*, by focusing on how variation of intensity around the BRL, namely the volatility of a rivalry's intensity, is affected by the volatility of other rivalries, it contributes to and goes beyond the existing literature that largely focuses on the influence of linkages on rivalry onset and termination only. Thus, the predominant focus here is on the conflict dynamics *during* a rivalry, rather than the start and conclusion. Diehl and Goertz refer to the idea of volatility as a combination of the severity of the various crises in the rivalry and the intensity of the BRL<sup>22</sup>, which is important because variation here determines whether a rivalry will experience war, or how likely a shock will lead to rivalry termination.

While rivalries do tend to stabilize around an average BRL level, it is important to remember that every departure from that BRL is a potential shock that could end the rivalry, i.e. a window of opportunity for resolution.<sup>23</sup> Thus, the *final* contribution lies in analyzing the stable line of the punctuated equilibrium during the lifetime of the rivalry in order to understand why some shocks terminate rivalries and others do not. To do so, the paper will elaborate on how the volatility of external major power rivalries affected the volatility of Greek-Turkish rivalries based on three theoretical propositions that follow our differentiation of RL versus OPL:

*T<sub>1</sub>: Domestic and dyadic factors (intra-rivalry) will have more impact on the volatility of a rivalry than the volatility of linked rivalries (extra-rivalry).*

*T<sub>2</sub>: In conditions of OPL, variation in the volatility of the major power rivalry may precede or follow variation in the volatility of the minor power rivalry.*

*T<sub>3</sub>: In conditions of RL, variation in the volatility of the major power rivalry is likely to precede variation in the volatility of the minor power rivalry.*

While *T<sub>1</sub>* reflects the accumulated findings and theoretical arguments of the existing rivalry literature, latter two refer to our contribution to the literature.

## **From Theory to Empirics: The Greek-Turkish Rivalries**

Greece and Turkey experienced two major rivalries over the past two decades.<sup>24</sup> The first was between the Greek state and the Ottoman Empire and lasted from 1866 to 1925.<sup>25</sup> It started with the Greek reaction to the Great Cretan Revolt of 1866-1869 and ended with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne after the decisive defeat of Greece by the new nationalist regime in Turkey; lasting 59 years, with 17 militarized interstate disputes, three wars (War of 1897, First Balkan War, and War of Turkish Independence). It followed a flat volatility pattern that fits the punctuated equilibrium model; was linked to 16 other severe rivalries through 37 links; and saw increasing extreme values, becoming unstable as the rivalry survived in time.<sup>26</sup>

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22 Diehl and Goertz, *War and Peace*, 164.

23 *Ibid.*, 227.

24 Klein *et al.*, *The New Rivalry*.

25 For a general overview of foreign policy of Greece, see E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours*, 5 Volumes, Paris, Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1925/1926; of the Ottoman Empire, see W. Hale, *Turkish foreign policy since 1774*, New York, Routledge, 2013.

26 Diehl and Goertz, *War and Peace*.

The second rivalry was between the Turkish Republic and the Greek state, which began in 1958 with the independence of Cyprus from Britain when the two states became embroiled in the triangular conflict between unionist Greek-Cypriots (seeking union with Greece), anti-unionist Greek-Cypriots (especially after 1974), and finally the Turkish-Cypriot community. As the conflict exacerbated, Turkey and Greece also started feuding over maritime and sovereignty issues in relation to the Greek Western Aegean Islands [and their waters]. Continuing to date, in 56 years, there have been 15 militarized disputes, and no wars (despite popular narratives, the Greek participation in the Turkish-Cypriot War of 1974 did not result in enough battle casualties to count as a COW war). Like the former rivalry, we see a flat volatility pattern that fits the punctuated equilibrium model; linked to 21 other severe rivalries through 31 links; and experienced concave extreme values.<sup>27</sup>

The Greek-Turkish rivalries of 1866-1925 and 1958-present are interesting cases to examine the dynamics of rivalry linkages. Neither rivalries were nested, i.e., the result of another rivalry. Instead, in both cases the rivalries were the result of internal political reactions to general international developments. In 1866, these constituted the Eastern Question and the rise of political nationalism, while in 1958, both states were facing the consequences of de-colonization. Both rivalries were very similar in their length, volatility patterns, and number of linkages. However, while the number of links are close, the types of linkages are different, as the former case had more linkages due to common dispute participation, which is an expected result of the fact that there was more warfare during the first rivalry than the second (5 to 1). In addition to more armed combat, the former also saw an escalating pattern of volatility, both due to intra-rivalry and a possible extra-rivalry factor of the systemic shock in advance of World War I.

The two rivalries are surprisingly isolated from the broader set of severe (ex-enduring) rivalries between the major powers. Between 1866 and 1925, 26 of the 37 rivalry linkages are due to indirect linkage or common participation in disputes, while only 11 linkages are a result of alliances. In the second case, between 1958 and present, 16 of the 31 linkages are due to indirect linkages or common participation in disputes, and only 15 are due to alliances. Unlike conventional popular perceptions, these findings show that the Greek-Turkish rivalries were not the result of major power conspiracies or structural international trends, but the consequences of either brief events like dispute participation or contiguity, predominantly with minor power rivals.

Between 1866 and 1912, Greece was unable to enter into successful alliances with any of the states of its neighboring regions or with any major power for several reasons. *First*, it was torn between the ambitions of the *Megali Idea*, which would have led Greece to seek a Russian alliance, and the fear of maritime powers of the United Kingdom and France, who consistently took decisive coercive action against a possible Greek-Russian alliance during the Crimean War, 1866 Cretan Revolt, the 1876-1881 Crisis, and the 1896-1898 Crisis. *Second*, the Greek military was underdeveloped and weak, which was exemplified by the defeat in the Greek-Ottoman War of 1897, making Greece an undesirable ally. Only after the Anglo-Russian rapprochement of the 1910s, Greece could enter into alliances with pro-Russian states in the Balkans without fear of the maritime powers, which resulted

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

in Greek participation in the Balkan Wars. These alliances were the Balkan League of 1912-13 and the Serbian alliance of 1913-14.

During the same period, the Ottoman Empire was in a number of major power alliances with Russia, the UK, and later Germany. From 1921 to 1925 the Turkish Republic entered an alliance with the USSR. Thus, in the period of the first rivalry, we only see alliance activity and OPL at a late/final stage, when Greece and the Ottoman Empire, with the entrance of the UK into the Entente Cordiale during World War I, found major power supporters for their rivalry.

Still, Greece was a co-belligerent rather than ally of the Entente Cordiale, and overall, there were not enough alliance linkages to justify the belief that rivalry linkages drove the intensity of the Greek-Turkish rivalry. Instead, linkages predominantly occurred indirectly or via brief conflicts such as in 1912-13 or in 1917-18. Similarly, the 1958-present rivalry did not see much direct connection to major power rivalries either. Greece and Turkey were both members of and deeply enmeshed in the NATO alliance, which did not permit either to seek outside allies in their conflict over Cyprus, or later in the Aegean. Neither ever allied with the USSR, therefore denying this rivalry OPL. Instead, the 1958 rivalry can largely be defined by RL. The US, as an ally of both Greece and Turkey, thus had an incentive to regulate their relations and dampen escalatory dynamics, as demonstrated in the Imia/Kardak crisis. However, in line with our explanation, when the US faced intensifications of its USSR rivalry, it was less able to regulate the Greek-Turkish case. The near war of 1974 over Cyprus, in the midst of the Yom Kippur international crisis, is such a case.

Overall, although alliance linkages with external rivalries were rare, it would be a fallacy to dismiss other types of alignments that have had an impact on the Greek-Turkish rivalry. States have a series of behaviors to express alignment in international politics as alternatives to alliances. Without a perfect alignment of interests, but with the willingness to support the position of a disputing power on a specific issue at stake, states may choose to align with one side in a dispute. While this is not as strong a form of alignment as alliances, it still creates linkages that may gain importance in the event of militarized issues. There are two such instances in the 1866-1925 period: *first*, during the 1881 dispute between the Ottoman Empire and Greece over the cessation of Thessaly, when the UK, France, Germany, and Italy took the side of Greece; and *second*, in 1917 with the official entry of Greece into World War I, when Germany supported the Ottoman Empire.<sup>28</sup>

During the second rivalry period, there is only one case of great power alignment, with the US supporting Turkey in the 1984 maritime crisis in the Aegean. Thus, the Greek-Turkish rivalries were not considered by the major powers as a useful field for competition during militarized disputes, probably because of the dominance of the maritime powers (the UK and France before 1925, and the USA in the post-1958 rivalry). This means that the vulnerability of the Aegean region to the projection of naval power by certain major powers tends to dissuade parties without comparable naval power projection capabilities from interfering in Greek-Turkish disputes, since they believe that such interference will bring them into conflict with the maritime powers.

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28 G. Rudkevich, "Correlates of political alignment: Jumping off the balancing bandwagon", Unpublished Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2014.

Accordingly, the most evident period of OPL in the Greek-Turkish rivalries is from 1914 to 1918, when Greece and the Ottoman Empire tended to support the Entente Cordiale powers and Germany respectively. The post-1958 rivalry is a clear case of RL, as the two rivals both joined NATO. The 1866-1914 period is more ambiguous. Yet it is closer to a case of RL, as a result of the coercive power of the maritime powers and the extreme vulnerability of both the Ottoman Empire and Greece against them. As such, it can be treated as a period of “weak” RL. Thus, our cases are two different periods in the 1866-1925 rivalry, and the 1958-present rivalry in its entirety.

## Research Design

The empirical observations in conjunction with the theoretical propositions expounded in the previous section lead to four empirical hypotheses:

*H<sub>1</sub>: Intra-rivalry factors should be more strongly associated with the variation in the volatility of Greek-Ottoman/Turkish rivalries compared to the variation in the volatility of relevant major power rivalries in the 1866-2001 period.*

*H<sub>2</sub>: During the 1914-1918 period of OPL, variation in the volatility of the Greek-Ottoman rivalry will likely be associated with variation in the volatility of relevant major power rivalries, whether it precedes or follows them.*

*H<sub>3</sub>: During the 1958-2001 period of RL, variation in the volatility of the Greek-Turkish rivalry will likely be associated with preceding variation in the volatility of relevant US major power rivalries.*

*H<sub>4</sub>: During the 1866-1914 period of weak RL, variation in the volatility of the Greek-Ottoman rivalry will likely be associated with preceding variation in the volatility of relevant French and UK major power rivalries.*

The unit of observation is the rivalry year, representing the calendar years of the Greek-Turkish rivalry. The temporal domain is 1866-1925 for the first, and 1958-2001 for the second rivalry.<sup>29</sup> The designation of 2001 as the end year is due to data availability when it comes to rivalry BRL level and alignment data, which in total creates a set of 105 annual observations.

The main dependent variable is the volatility of severity of the Greek-Turkish rivalries, based on the BRL coded by Diehl and Goertz. The stable level of the rivalry from inception to end was used for every year of the rivalry, except in the event of a dispute. In such cases, the rivalry severity level of the dispute is coded. Thus, in some years, the severity level of the rivalry is lower or higher than the BRL. The coding decision follows that once a rivalry begins, the BRL locks in, and can be treated as the baseline severity of a rivalry from inception to end, with variation as a result of specific militarized disputes. The BRL of the 1866-1925 rivalry is 87, and the range of severity scores is 197 (maximum of 201, minimum of 4). The BRL of the 1958-2001 rivalry is 65, and the range 91 (maximum of 95, minimum of 4).

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<sup>29</sup> Diehl and Goertz, *War and Peace*.

The main independent variables are the volatility of severity of relevant major power rivalries, which is coded identically to the Greek-Turkish volatility (see Table I). Major Powers are chosen from the COW [major power membership] dataset, however not all major powers or major power rivalries are relevant to the Greek-Turkish case. Only those major powers that projected power into the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean or on the borders of the Ottoman Empire/Turkey were likely to become embroiled in the Greek-Turkish dispute. In the 1866-1925 period, these included France, the UK, Russia, Italy, and Germany – although Austria-Hungary could affect the decisions of the Ottoman Empire, it was not a relevant power in the Aegean. In the 1958-modern period, these were the USSR, the USA, and the UK.

**Table I: Relevant Major Power Rivalries**

Major Power Rivalry	UK vs. Russia	UK vs. Germany	Germany vs. Italy	France vs. Germany	USSR-US	USSR-UK
<b>Related Greek-Turkish Rivalry</b>	1866-1925	1866-1925	1866-1925	1866-1925	1958-1999	1958-2000
<b>Temporal Period</b>	1876-1923	1887-1921	1915-1925	1866-1925	1958-2001	1958-2001
<b>BRL</b>	82	77	97	61	66	58
<b>Range</b>	91 (95-4)	197(201-4)	200(202-2)	199(203-4)	62(66-4)	91(95-4)

The type of linkage between the Greek-Turkish rivalries and the major power rivalries is a conditional variable: the 1866-1914 period is coded as weak RL, the 1914-25 period as OPL, and the 1958-2001 period as RL.

A number of intra-rivalry variables were considered as control variables for alternative explanations (see Table I of the Online Appendix). All of these are variables that the existing literature has located as having an important impact on rivalry dynamics. They are grouped into three categories: the *first* set, covering regime type and political shocks, corresponds to the idea that political shocks and political conditions in the two rivals can explain rivalry maintenance. The presence of dyadic democracy can act as an inhibitor for the escalation of conflict within a rivalry. The distance between the polity scores of the two states is a proxy for the conflict-inducing conditions brought about by regime differences. Coups, while potential termination shocks, can also lead to variation in rivalry volatility. Changes in the size of the winning coalition can capture how increases or decreases in the participation in politics can affect rivalry dynamics.

The *second* set includes variables that relate to the distribution of material power between the rivals. Changes in this distribution can lead to changes in rivalry dynamics as newfound material strength, or weakness, can foster policies that range from negotiations to end the rivalry and avoid a negative military solution to preventive motives that lead to escalation in the face of power transition. Because of the importance of naval power for control of the Aegean, the focus is not only on land power, but also naval tonnage.

The *final* set refers to the connection of the rivals to the global political and economic system: whether they are allied to each other; whether they are in unshared alliances, a potential conflict-fostering condition; how much they trade with each other; and finally, whether they share membership

in international organizations – the latter two constituting potential peace-fostering factors. One of the fundamental axioms of science is that a condition that does not vary cannot explain a condition that varies. When we checked the empirical record it quickly became apparent that not all of these control variables varied depending on the case of interest (see Table II).

All control variables are lagged a rivalry year. As  $H_2$  is only evaluated in the 1914-1918 period, with an  $n$  of 5, it is explored non-quantitatively. The other three hypotheses have enough observations for quantitative methods. The large number of potential control variables considered, and the rather small  $n$  of even the evaluations that can be explored via quantitative methods, necessitate a conservative attitude to including control variables in the models. As a first effort to winnow the field of relevant control variables, we use correlations with rivalry severity to establish which control variables have statistically significant correlation with it. Although this is a bit un-orthodox, we prefer to avoid a kitchen-sink approach in the models themselves. Each of our four cases exhibits correlation (one case is both rivalries treated as one period, two cases are from the 1866-1925 rivalry, and the fourth case is the 1958-present rivalry).

**Table II: Control Variables for Endogenous Alternative Explanations**

Variable	Source	Type	Mean or Median	Range	Temporal Domain
Dyadic Democracy	Polity IV Dataset	Categorical	0 (Median)	0 or 1	1866-2001
State Polity Score		Ordinal	10 for Greece, -2 for Turkey/Ottoman Empire (Median)	-7 to 10 for Greece -10 to 9 for Turkey/Ottoman Empire	
Political Distance (Difference of Polity Scores)		Ordinal	13 (Median)	20 to 1	
Winning Coalition Size	Bueno De Mesquita <i>et al</i>	Interval Ratio	0.725 for Greece 0.24 for Turkey/Ottoman Empire (Mean)	1 to 0.25 for Greece 0.56 to 0.06 for Turkey/Ottoman Empire	1866-1999
Coups	Polity IV Coup Data	Categorical	0 for both (median)	0 or 1	
At least one Coup in last five rivalry years		Categorical	0 (Median)	0 or 1	
Both coup in last five rivalry years		Categorical	0 (Median)	0 or 1	
CINC Scores	Correlates of War National Military	Interval Ratio	0.0027 for Greece 0.0014 for Turkey/Ottoman Empire (Mean)	0.001 to 0.007 for Greece 0.005 to 0.004 for Turkey/Ottoman Empire	1866-2001
Ratio of CINC Scores		Interval Ratio	0.23 (Mean)	0.03 to 1.10	

Power Transition in five rivalry years in the future		Categorical	0 (Median)	0 or 1	
High Asymmetry		Categorical	0 (Median)	0 or 1	
Naval Power (in Tonnage)	Crisher and Souva Power at Sea Dataset v.1	Count	21676 for Greece 65290 for Ottoman Empire (Mean)	1628 to 78444 for Greece 10500 to 108625 for Turkey/Ottoman Empire	
Naval Power Ration		Interval Ratio	0.64 (Mean)	0.04 to 4.22	
Naval High Asymmetry		Categorical	0 (Median)	0 or 1	
Naval Power Transition in five rivalry years in the future		Categorical	0(Median)	0 or 1	
GDP per Capita	Maddison Data	Interval Ratio	4176.552 for Greece 3849.407 for Turkey/Ottoman Empire (Mean)	848 to 12592 for Greece 712 to 6509 for Turkey/Ottoman Empire	1866-2001 (with gaps)
Allied to each other in rivalry year	ATOP Dataset	Categorical	0 (Median)	0 or 1	1866-2001
At least one outside alliance in rivalry year		Categorical	1 (Median)	0 or 1	
Number of outside alliances in rivalry year		Count	3 (Mean)	0 to 22	
Imports from Rival	Correlates of War Trade Dataset	Interval Ratio	46.9 for Greece 42.7 for Turkey (Mean)	0.7 to 492 for Greece 0.1 to 430 for Turkey	1869-2001
Ratio of Greek imports from Turkey/Turkish Imports from Greece		Interval Ratio	3.7 (Mean)	0.1 to 33.5	
At least one shared IGO membership	Correlates of War IGO membership Data	Categorical	1 (Median)	0 or 1	1866-2001

Table II presents the preliminary results about relevant control variables: while fifteen control variables had a statistically significant correlation with severity overall ( $H_1$ ), this number fell to only three in the period 1866-1913 ( $H_4$ ), and none in the period 1958-2001 ( $H_3$ ). In addition, we can exclude those control variables that are highly correlated with each other. In the case of politics, only *Turkish Winning Coalition* and *Dyadic Democracy* are included in the final model. From the capability-related variables, only *Greek CINC Score* and *Power Transition*

*in Five Years* are included in regression models. *Turkey Naval Power* and *Greek GDP per Capita*, which are independent from the other variables, are also used. Within the set of interrelated variables concerning alliance dynamics, *At Least One Outside Ally* is the single variable to be included in the model. Within the set of trade imports-related variables, the two state centric variables are highly correlated (0.95), and either can be used in models. Since *Import Ratio* was insignificant, a minimum score strategy might be more preferable. In general, the *Turkish Imports from Greece* variable holds the lowest scores of the two import variables, and thus, included in the final model. The variable of *Shared IGO Membership* is also incorporated. For  $H_4$ , the correlation between *Naval Power Greece* and *Naval Power Ratio* is (0.96). Subsequent regression diagnostics indicated that the use of the former is a superior adoption. Overall,  $H_1$  has ten,  $H_3$  has none, and  $H_4$  has two control variables included in the final model.

### ***Evaluation of the Whole Period of the Greek-Turkish/Ottoman Rivalries***

$H_1$  is used to evaluate the argument that intra-rivalry factors are more important in explaining variation in the BRL of the Greek-Turkish rivalries compared to variations in major power rivalry severity. The first test employed is OLS regression analysis, in which a 0.10 level of significance is used for a rather low  $n$  of 79 observations. We use OLS regression because rivalry severity as operationalized by BRL levels is an interval-ratio variable. The *log of Turkish Naval Power* is included due to the high range of values it generated. Regression diagnostics indicated issues of outliers, observations with high leverage, certain issues of normality and multicollinearity, and omitted variable bias, mostly as a result of the rivalry variables, and thus could not be manipulated without compromising the integrity of the argument. Important variables varied only within the most problematic observations, whose exclusion would also be theoretically suspect. Excluding *Power Transition in Five Years* addresses some, but not all of the aforementioned issues. Thus, the results of the model should only be taken as broad indicators of dynamics, rather than strong empirical evidence.

Table III presents the results of two models; one includes *Power Transition in Five Years*, and one does not. In both cases the number of intra-rivalry variables that exhibit statistically significant behavior is greater than those of external rivalries. The UK-Russia rivalry of 1876-1923 exhibits a statistically significant behavior in both models, with the German-Italy one similarly demonstrating such behavior in one of the two models. All others do not. Thus, the indicators of the evaluation do not falsify  $H_1$ . As Diehl and Goertz originally argued, intra-rivalry factors tend to account for variation in severity around the BRL of the Greek-Turkish rivalries.

**Table III: Variation among Control Variables**

Variable	Source	1866-1913	1914-18	1958-2001
Dyadic Democracy	Polity IV Dataset	No Variation	No Variation	<b>Variation</b>
State Polity Score		<b>Limited Variation</b>	Missing Values Greece, No Variation Turkey	<b>Variation for both</b>
Political Distance(Difference of Polity Scores)		<b>Some Variation</b>	Mostly Missing Values	<b>Variation</b>
Winning Coalition Size	Bueno De Mesquita <i>et al.</i>	<b>Limited Variation</b> Greece, No Variation Turkey	<b>Some variation</b> Greece, no Variation Turkey	<b>Variation for both</b>
Coups	Polity IV Coup Data	No Variation Greece, <b>Limited Variation Turkey</b>	Missing Values for both	<b>Little variation for both</b>
At least one Coup in last five rivalry years		<b>Some Variation</b>	No Variation	<b>Little Variation</b>
Both coup in last five rivalry years		No Variation	No Variation	No Variation
CINC Scores	Correlates of War National Military	<b>Variation</b>	<b>Variation</b>	<b>Variation</b>
Ratio of CINC Scores		<b>Variation</b>	<b>Variation</b>	<b>Variation</b>
Power Transition in five rivalry years in the future		No Variation	<b>Variation</b>	No Variation
High Asymmetry		No Variation	<b>Variation</b>	No Variation
Naval Power(in Tonnage)	Crisher and Souva Power at Sea Dataset v.1	<b>Variation</b>	No Variation Greece <b>Little Variation Turkey</b>	<b>Variation for both</b>
Naval Power Ratio		<b>Variation</b>	<b>Little Variation</b>	<b>Variation</b>
Naval High Asymmetry		<b>Variation</b>	No Variation	No Variation
Naval Power Transition in five rivalry years in the future		No Variation	<b>Variation</b>	<b>Variation</b>
GDP per Capita	Maddison Data	<b>Variation</b> Greece Mostly Missing Values Ottoman Empire	<b>Variation for</b> Greece, Missing for Turkey	<b>Variation for both</b>
Allied to each other in rivalry year	ATOP Dataset	No Variation	No Variation	No Variation
At least one outside alliance in rivalry year		<b>Little Variation</b>	No Variation	No Variation
Number of outside alliances in rivalry year		<b>Little Variation</b>	No Variation	<b>Variation</b>
Imports from Rival	Correlates of War Trade Dataset	<b>Variation</b>	Missing Values	<b>Variation for both</b>
Ratio of Greek imports from Turkey/Turkish Imports from Greece		<b>Variation</b>	Missing Values	<b>Variation</b>
At least one shared IGO membership	Correlates of War IGO membership Data	<b>Little Variation</b>	No Variation	No Variation

For robustness we ran an alternative analysis. We created a new dummy independent variable, thereby permitting to run a Poisson regression (see Table IV). The new dummy variable takes the value of 1 when the severity score in the Greek-Turkish rivalry is different than that of the BRL and takes the value of 0 otherwise. This approach does sacrifice some information, namely the magnitude of volatility, but also allows us to avoid the aforementioned problems with the OLS model.

**Table IV: Correlations Between Control Variables and Dependent Variable**

1886-1925, 1958-2001 (n=106)	Correlation with Severity	1866-1913 (n=49)	Correlation with Severity	1958-2001 (n=44)	Correlation with Severity
Dyadic Democracy	<b>-0.2968***</b>	Greece Polity Score	0.0292	Dyadic Democracy	-0.1022
Greece Polity Score	0.0991	Turkey Political Score	0.0159	Greece Polity Score	-0.0579
Turkish Polity Score	<b>-0.4087***</b>	Political Distance	-0.0065	Turkey Political Score	-0.1394
Political Distance (Difference of Polity Scores)	<b>0.3993***</b>	Greek Winning Coalition Size	0.1107	Political Distance	0.0802
Greece Winning Coalition Size	0.0240	Turkey Coups	0.0810	Greek Winning Coalition	-0.0102
Turkey Winning Coalition Size	<b>-0.4137***</b>	At Least One Coup in Last Five Years of Rivalry	-0.0844	Turkish Winning Coalition	-0.1004
Greece Coups	0.0195	CINC Score Greece	0.0437	Turkey Coups	0.0958
Turkey Coups	0.0128	CINC Score Turkey	<b>-0.3347**</b>	Greece Coups	0.0669
At least one Coup in last five rivalry years	-0.0498	Ratio CINC	0.1364	At Least One Coup in Last Five Years of Rivalry	0.2212
Both coup in last five rivalry years	-0.0204	Naval Power Greece	<b>0.3272**</b>	CINC Score Greece	-0.1865
Greek CINC Score	<b>-0.1677*</b>	Naval Power Turkey	-0.2002	CINC Score Turkey	-0.1484
Turkey CINC Score	0.0758	Naval Power Ratio	<b>0.3977***</b>	Ratio CINC	0.0842
Ratio of CINC Scores	-0.0260	Naval High Asymmetry	-0.2423	Naval Power Greece	-0.1823
Power Transition in five rivalry years in the future	<b>0.3511***</b>	GDP per Capita Greece	0.2341	Naval Power Turkey	-0.1983
High Asymmetry	<b>0.3455***</b>	At Least One Outside Alliance in Rivalry Year	0.1392	Naval Power Transition	0.1469

Greece Naval Power (in Tonnage)	-0.1604	<b>Number of Outside Alliances</b>	0.1392	<b>GDP per Capita Greece</b>	-0.2047
Turkey Naval Power (in Tonnage)	<b>-0.1767*</b>	<b>Greek Imports from Turkey</b>	-0.1649	<b>GDP per Capita Turkey</b>	-0.1909
Naval Power Ratio	0.1036	<b>Turkish Imports from Greece</b>	0.0085	<b>Number of Outside Alliances</b>	-0.1897
Naval High Asymmetry	0.1608	<b>Ratio of Imports</b>	-0.1728	<b>Greek Imports from Turkey</b>	-0.1835
Naval Power Transition in five rivalry years in the future	-0.0591	<b>Shared IGO Membership</b>	0.0752	<b>Turkish Imports from Greece</b>	-0.1957
Greece GDP per Capita	<b>-0.4092***</b>			<b>Ratio of Imports</b>	-0.0078
Turkey GDP per Capita	-0.1513				
Allied to each other in rivalry year	<b>-0.4257***</b>				
At least one outside alliance in rivalry year	<b>-0.2882**</b>				
Number of outside alliances in rivalry year	<b>-0.2937**</b>				
Greek Imports from Turkey	<b>-0.2783*</b>				
Turkey Imports from Greece	<b>-0.2654*</b>				
Ratio of Greek imports from Turkey/Turkish Imports from Greece	-0.1482				
At least one shared IGO membership	<b>-0.2717**</b>				
Significance Levels *>.10 **>.05 ***>.01					

The results of the Poisson regression, when only focusing on the claims of  $H_1$ , do not significantly differ from those of the OLS regression. Comparably, only one intra-rivalry variable exhibits a statistically significant influence. The goodness-of-fit statistic indicates that the regression is appropriate.  $H_1$  is not falsified. Thus, the evaluations of  $H_1$  indicate that intra-rivalry variables of the Greek-Turkish rivalry hold superior potential for explaining variation in the volatility of this rivalry than the volatility of linked major power rivalries.

### ***Intra-Rivalry and Extra-Rivalry Factors in OPL, 1914-1918***

In  $H_2$  we claimed that during periods of OPL, variation in the severity of the Greek-Turkish rivalry could either precede or follow variation in the rivalries of the relevant major powers. For the Greek-Turkish case the only period of OPL is 1914-18. As stated earlier, due to a small number of observations ( $n=5$ ),  $H_2$  is primarily evaluated by descriptive statistics and narration. The normal, not lagged, versions of the variables are used. During 1914-18, the Greek-Turkish rivalry experienced three years of variation from the BRL; while 1914 and 1917 saw disputes with less severity, the dispute in 1918 reached a higher level than the BRL. Analyzing the variation in the control variables of interest in the period from 1913 to 1918, we find that the *Ottoman Polity Score* was -1, indicating an autocracy, but not a totalitarian regime. In 1918 the country entered a prolonged period of interregnum. In general, there was no significant variation in *Turkish Polity Score*.

From 1913 to 1915, there was change among capability distribution, as the *Power Ratio* became more asymmetrical with an advantage for the Ottoman Empire due to its mobilization for World War I on the one hand and Greek demobilization after the Balkan Wars on the other. The 1914 dispute was preceded by a year of a more balanced distribution. From 1916 to 1917 the distribution became less asymmetrical as Greece began mobilizing, and the Ottoman Empire suffered friction due to war. The disputes of 1917 and 1918 happened in the shadow of a power transition between the Ottoman Empire and Greece that would take place over the coming five years. Only 1917 was preceded by variation. Thus, the 1914 dispute was not preceded by high asymmetry, but the 1917-1918 disputes followed a change in asymmetry in 1916.

The *Allied to Each Other* and *At Least One Outside Alliance* variables do not exhibit variation in the period of interest. There is a change in the *Number of Outside Alliances* variable between 1913 and 1914, but not for the period of 1914-18. Thus, the 1914 dispute is preceded by variation in this specific variable, but not the 1917 and 1918 disputes. There is no information on trade imports between the two states for the 1914-18 period, indicating a collapse of trade relations, which precedes the 1914 dispute, but the 1917 and 1918 disputes take place in a condition of no variation.

Accordingly, only changes in material capabilities may have influenced the variation in severity around the BRL for the three disputes that took place between 1913 and 1918. The 1914 dispute might also have been influenced by the collapse of trade relations and the increase in the number of outside alliances within the rivalry. Moving on to relevant major power rivalries (see Table VII), the UK-Russian rivalry was stable in 1913-16 and subsequently saw an increase in severity in the 1917-18 period. The variation is contemporaneous with the 1916-17 changes in the Greek-Ottoman rivalry, but while the UK-Russian rivalry saw an increase, the Greek-Ottoman rivalry saw a decrease in severity compared to the BRL.

The UK-German rivalry was stable in severity, with the exception of higher severity of the dispute that led to the onset of World War I in 1914. The 1913-14 variation is contemporaneous with the 1913-14 changes in the Greek-Ottoman rivalry, but, again, the severity of the UK-German rivalry increased, while the severity of the Greek-Ottoman rivalry decreased compared to the BRL. The same conditions apply to the German-Italian and the German-French rivalries. Accordingly, of the three Greek-Ottoman disputes, only the 1914 dispute might have a relationship of precedence or antecedence with variation in the severity dynamics of relevant major power rivalries.

To define cases of antecedence or precedence, the annual level of analysis has to be replaced by the specific start dates of the disputes. Based on the COW MID 4.02 Dataset, the German-UK and German-France disputes began on 25-26 July 1914 and would last into 1918; the German-Italian dispute commenced on 20 October 1914 and would last into 1915; and the Greek-Ottoman dispute began on 13 August and ended on 18 August 1914. Thus, while the British and French disputes with Germany preceded the Greek-Ottoman dispute, the German-Italian dispute followed it. These dynamics are summarized in Table V.

**Table V: OLS Regressions for Hypothesis I**

	<b>Original Model</b>	<b>Excluding Power Transition</b>
<b>Variable</b>	Severity	Severity
<b>Dyadic Democracy</b>	18.88244 (14.77957)	19.58007 (15.59494)
<b>Turkish Winning</b>	-50.04955 (34.823)	-76.71472 (35.42332)**
<b>Coalition Size</b>		
<b>Greek CINC Score</b>	-20113.93 (6316.046)***	-12001.09 (5964.071)**
<b>Power Transition in next 5 years</b>	89.26998 (31.03161)***	Not Included
<b>Turkish Naval Power (log)</b>	-11.80559 (21.17462)	-52.09407 (16.76011)***
<b>Greek GDP per Capita</b>	-.0008299 (.004378)	.0051771 (.0040608)
<b>At least one outside ally</b>	97.73286 (30.73237)***	44.69618 (25.9482)*
<b>Turkish Imports from Greece</b>	.0612829 (.0652646)	.0704427 (.0687924)
<b>Shared IGO Membership</b>		
<b>UK-Russia Severity</b>	.576239 (.2542614)**	.6590728 (.2665988)**
<b>UK-Germany Severity</b>	.1919955 (.2100352)	-.079884 (.2172693)
<b>Germany-Italy Severity</b>	-.2996763 (.2417486)	-.7698314 (.3049417)**
<b>UK-USSR</b>	-.237335 (.2314468)	-.1542399 (.243136)
<b>US-USSR</b>	-.1481938 (.1988431)	-.0378181 (.2053374)
<b>Germany-France</b>	.3056031 (.3144732)	.2715789 (.3317168)
	<b>*&gt; 0.10 **&gt;0.05 ***&gt;0.01 ****&gt;0.001</b>	

Considering the specific histories of the disputes, the July 1914 Crisis can be considered to have had an influence on the Greek-Ottoman 1914 crisis over the Aegean islands. The two states were engaged in a naval arms race, preparing to fight a war over control of the Western Aegean.<sup>30</sup> The outbreak of the July Crisis, and especially the war, hindered such intentions; the ships ordered to fight the war were either impounded for World War I or their construction stopped. This change in expected material capabilities, as well as the focus of the major powers on the war, might have led to a quick attempt to resolve the issue by intimidation as the crisis saw Greece threatening to use force, and the Ottoman Empire making a show of force. The German-Italian dispute was the result of an Austrian-Italian dispute, which cannot be seen as connected to the Greek-Ottoman dispute that preceded it.

30 Z. Fotakis, *Greek Naval Strategy and Policy 1910-1919*, New York, NY, Routledge, 2005.

Overall,  $H_2$  is falsified by the analysis, as only one of three Greek-Ottoman disputes in the period of OPL is connected to disputes in the relevant major power rivalries. In two of three cases, the variation in the Greek-Ottoman rivalry is preceded by variation in the relevant major power rivalry, as well as changes in five control variables – lowering the level of confidence in the explanatory value of the variables.

### ***Dynamics During RL***

Through  $H_3$  we evaluate the character of the association between the Greek-Turkish rivalry of 1958-2001 with the relevant US rivalries, i.e. with Russia/USSR, under conditions of RL. The argument asserts that as the US focused on its own conflicts in periods of acute rivalry with Russia/USSR, this opened space for Greece and Turkey to be more adventurous. As a result, the variation in the volatility of the Greek-Turkish rivalry should be associated with preceding variation in the volatility of relevant US major power rivalries. Data shows that while eight of 18 Greek-Turkish deviations from the BRL were preceded by a US-USSR deviation in the previous year, or earlier in the same year, ten of 25 US-USSR deviations from the BRL in this era followed a Greek-Turkish deviation in the previous year, or earlier in the same calendar year. Even at this simple level, it is clear that  $H_3$  is falsified.

As none of the control variables were significantly correlated with severity in the 1958-2001 period, power correlation is used to evaluate whether preceding variation in the volatility of the US-USSR rivalry is associated with variation in the volatility of the Greek-Turkey rivalry. The correlation between the lagged value of US-USSR severity and Greek-Turkey severity is -0.08 and is not statistically significant.  $H_3$  is re-falsified by the evaluations.

Similarly,  $H_4$  evaluates an identical argument, but for the more limited form of RL during the 1866-1913 period of the 1866-1925 rivalry. It focuses on the alignment connections between the Greek-Ottoman rivalry and the major power rivalries of the two maritime powers, France and the UK. As in the case of the post-1958 rivalry, the expectation is that variation in the Greek-Ottoman rivalry severity will follow variation in the severity of the relevant British and French rivalries with other powers (Germany and Russia in this period).

A basic look at the data indicates a very weak linkage between the minor power and major power rivalries in question: only four of 11 cases of variation in severity from the BRL of the Greek-Ottoman rivalry were preceded by such variations in the UK-Russia, UK-Germany, or Germany-France rivalries; and only four of 15 cases of variation in the relevant major power rivalries were preceded by variation in the Greek-Ottoman rivalry. In other words, the number of variations in the BRL of the Greek-Ottoman rivalry *preceding* variations in the BRL of the major power rivalries is similar to the number of those *following* variations in the BRL of the major power rivalries. This runs against  $H_4$ . We also ran an OLS model, and regression diagnostics indicated to take the log of the *Naval Power Greece*. The results are presented in Table VI and indicate that only the *Turkey CINC Score* variable exhibits statistically significant behavior, thus falsifying  $H_4$ .

**Table VI: Poisson Regression for Hypothesis I**

Variable	Severity
<b>Dyadic Democracy</b>	.0186662 (.5772964)
<b>Turkish Winning Coalition Size</b>	1.394322 (1.373119)
<b>Greek CINC Score</b>	-41.83398 (165.6162)
<b>Power Transition in next 5 years</b>	2.424328 (1.512402)
<b>Turkish Naval Power (log)</b>	2.069284 (1.182169)*
<b>Greek GDP per Capita</b>	-.0002927 (.0002356)
<b>At least one outside ally</b>	2.541245 (1.853539)
<b>Turkish Imports from Greece</b>	.0000436 (.0023921)
<b>Shared IGO Membership</b>	.5723398 (1.679467)
<b>UK-Russia Severity</b>	.000198 (.0144684)
<b>UK-Germany Severity</b>	-.00849 (.0105283)
<b>Germany-Italy Severity</b>	.0141261 (.019387)
<b>UK-USSR</b>	-.0004186 (.0111526)
<b>US-USSR</b>	-.009275 (.0088473)
<b>Germany-France</b>	-.0015322 (.0266963)
<b>*&gt;0.10 **&gt;0.05 ***&gt;0.01 ****&gt;0.001</b>	

We also ran a Poisson regression, using the dummy variable version of the Greek-Ottoman rivalry severity variable (see Table VII). The “goodness-of-fit” test indicates that Poisson is an appropriate model for the data. However, the findings of the Poisson regression again falsify  $H_4$ , leaving no robust evidence that under conditions of weak RL in the 1866-1913 period, preceding variation in the severity of the relevant major power rivalries is associated with variation in the severity of the Greek-Ottoman rivalry. The focus of the major powers on their rivalries does not seem to affect the dynamics of the Greek-Ottoman rivalry.

**Table VII: Rivalry Dynamics under ‘Oppositional Linkage’**

Greek-Turkish Variation in Severity compared to BRL	1913-1914	1916-1917	1917-1918
<b>Type of variation compared to BRL</b>	Lower Severity	Lower Severity	Higher Severity
Preceded by variation in Turkish Polity Score	No	No	Yes
<b>Preceded by variation in Power Ratio</b>	Yes	No	No
Preceded by variation in High Asymmetry	Yes	No	No
<b>Preceded by variation in Power Transition in five years</b>	No	Yes	No
Preceded by variation in Allied to each other	No	No	No
<b>Preceded by variation in At least one outside alliance</b>	No	No	No
Preceded by variation in number of outside alliances	Yes	No	No
<b>Preceded by variation in imports</b>	Yes	No	No
Variation in UK-Russia Severity	No	Contemporaneous	No

<b>Variation in UK-Germany Severity</b>	Contemporaneous (preceding at monthly level of analysis)	No	No
Variation in Germany-Italy Severity	Contemporaneous (following at monthly level of analysis)	No	No
<b>Variation in France-Germany Severity</b>	Contemporaneous (preceding at monthly level of analysis)	No	No

**Table VIII: OLS Regression for Hypothesis IV\***

Variable	Greek-Turkish Rivalry Severity
<b>CINC Score Turkey</b>	-2425.889 (1122.316)**
<b>Naval Power Greece (log)</b>	10.93093 (13.07509)
<b>UK-Russia</b>	-.2957208 (.1957273)
<b>UK-Germany</b>	.0535366 (.2153853)
<b>France-Germany</b>	.1048684 (.1588554)
<b>*&gt;0.10 **&gt;0.05 ***&gt;0.001****&gt;0.0001</b>	

\*The model has issues of outliers and observations with leverage; however, taking out the problem years marginally changes the model. The only change is that *CINC Score Turkey* becomes insignificant. There are issues of normality, which cannot be fixed by excluding observations. While there is no collinearity, there is instability, which can only be fixed by excluding all control variables. It was decided not to do so.

**Table IX: Poisson Regression for Hypothesis IV**

Variable	Greek-Turkish Rivalry Severity
<b>CINC Score Turkey</b>	88.48407 (31.3140)***
<b>Naval Power Greece</b>	-.1375226 (.5755863)
<b>UK-Russia</b>	.012436 (.0105332)
<b>UK-Germany</b>	-.0074538 (.0103485)
<b>France-Germany</b>	-.01562 (.0104207)
<b>*&gt;0.10 **&gt;0.05 ***&gt;0.001****&gt;0.0001</b>	

## Conclusion

Popular opinion and the tumultuous history of Greek-Turkish relations present the two states as being at the mercy of major power antagonisms. Against this conventional understanding, and based on the work of Goertz and Diehl, we argue that the rivalries are primarily driven by endogenous factors rather than external linkages. Our narrative exploration of the two Greek-Turkish rivalries presented a picture of variation in intensity and types of linkages with relevant major power rivalries. During the 1914-18 period, the Greek-Ottoman rivalry was linked with relevant major power rivalries in an OPL. In other words, Greece and the Ottoman Empire were each linked with a different rival in a major power rivalry. In the 1958-2001 period, the two states were both allied with the US, and thus were in a strong RL. Finally, in the 1866-1913 period, the two states were commonly aligned with the maritime powers, the UK and France, in a weak form of RL.

Among the four hypotheses evaluated here via a multi-methods approach, only  $H_1$  was not falsified, i.e. endogenous factors have a stronger influence on the volatility, i.e. variation of the severity around the BRL, of the Greek-Ottoman (later Turkish) rivalries compared to the influence of the volatility of relevant major power rivalries – echoing the standard narrative by Goertz and Diehl.  $H_2$ ,

focusing on the period of OPL, explored whether variation in the severity of the Greek-Ottoman rivalry preceded, or followed, variation in the severity in the relevant major power rivalries. The results falsified the hypothesis, though a useful finding was that variation in the Greek-Ottoman rivalry tends to be preceded by variation in the relevant major power rivalries.  $H_3$  and  $H_4$ , focusing on the periods of strong and weak RL, were also proven false, as the variation in the volatility of the Greek-Turkish and Greek-Ottoman rivalry were not associated with preceding variation in the volatility of relevant major power rivalries, and there was also no statistically significant correlation between the variations in the different rivalries.

Overall, the results of the analysis here show that Greek-Ottoman/Turkish rivalries are driven by endogenous conditions. The strife is not the product of major power influence, involvement, or planning as the popular vision holds, and thus, should not be expected to subside because of changes in major power relations. Instead, a positive peace between Greece and Turkey must be the result of hard work within the two countries themselves.<sup>31</sup>

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31 G. Goertz *et al.* *The Peace Puzzle: Explaining the Rise of Peace in the International System*, New York, NY, Oxford University Publishing, 2016.