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DOMESTIC POLITICS IN CYPRUS: GROUNDS FOR MIGRANT VOICES

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In a comparative analysis of the two de facto states of the island—the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, this paper describes the domestic political life on the island and explores how the issue of migration is treated in its domestic politics. It is argued here that neither side receives very high scores in regards to their policies towards immigrants, i.e., members of one community living in the territory controlled by the other, which has rather discouraging implications for the future in terms of a settlement of the Cyprus problem, a conflict between two communities that have historically perceived the opposing side as the ‘other’.

Cyprus and its frozen conflict are usually mentioned without much consideration for its domestic politics. With few exceptions (Farr 1997; Taki 2003), most of the literature describes Cyprus as either a regional problem between Greece and Turkey (Saleem 1992), an international case of conflict perpetuation (Haass 1990; Joseph 1997; Richmond 2002; Williams 1996; Drath 2003; Hampson 1996; Camp 1998), an extension of colonial politics (Pollis 1973, 1998; Richmond 2002), or a new issue area for the European Union (Diez 2002; Nugent 2003; Vassiliou 2003; Dundas 2004; Theophylactou 1995; Bahcheli 2001). Most of the literature on Cyprus focuses on the regional and/or international aspects of Cypriot politics, and pays less attention to the island’s vivid domestic political life.

A similar neglect is also present when discussing the demographics of the island. The literature treats the population living on the island as if there are two homogenous communities of Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks, without much consideration for the migrants or minorities—maybe with the possible exception of (1) post-1974 migrants from mainland Turkey in the north whose presence in the island is an issue of controversy between and within the two sides, and (2) the Maronite, Latin, and Armenian minorities

whose presence is acknowledged by both sides in the peace negotiations. The reality is very different. To illustrate, at the hotel where I was staying during my fieldtrip to Cyprus in Summer 2005, the receptionist was Russian, the barmaid was British, the waitress was Romanian, and the handyman was Bangladeshi. This made me realize that Cyprus' diverse demographic is mainly a result of migration. In fact, relative to its population size, among European Union countries, the Greek part of Cyprus had the largest positive migration balance (+27.2 per 1,000 inhabitants) in 2005.

In a comparative analysis of the two *de facto* states of the island—the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, this paper will describe the domestic political life on the island and explore the following questions: How is the issue of migration treated in the domestic politics of the island? Is there any way to achieve representation for migrants in domestic political life? Are there any political parties that they feel closer to? Do they have rights? If so, to what extent can they enjoy them? What were the effects of The Republic of Cyprus' gaining EU membership on the issue of migration?

The rest of this paper is divided into six sections. The first will give some historical background in order to understand the underlying reasons for the *de facto* division of the island. The second section defines main trends and developments in migration in the south, while the third reviews the domestic political life in the south, seeing how political parties touch on the issue of migration. The fourth and fifth sections do the same for the north, and the final section, I give a brief analysis in terms of conclusion. It will be argued here that neither side in Cyprus scores very high in terms of their policies towards immigrants, i.e., members of one community living on the side controlled by the other, which has rather discouraging implications for the future in terms of a settlement of the Cyprus problem, a conflict between two communities that have historically perceived the opposing side as the 'other'.

Historical Background

Cyprus was destined to be a battlefield of the Near East and the prey of contending faiths and rival empires; hence it has ever been a meeting-place of races and tongues as it had already become a meeting-place of gods (Luke 1957: 17).

'Heaven bless the Isle of Cyprus,' cried Othello's herald, and all lovers of the once enchanted, now bewitched Island can say Amen to that. No country needs Heaven's blessing more (*ibid.*: 192).

Although it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the history of Cyprus in detail, the aim of this section is to better equip the reader to understand the key events that represent the basis of the current conflict, because any domestic political issue in Cyprus is closely linked to the conflict at large. Thus, it is almost impossible to analyze domestic politics in Cyprus without knowing about the Cyprus conflict in general. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have totally different interpretations of the history of Cyprus. They fail to agree not only on recent history, but also on the ancient history of the island. While Turkish Cypriots emphasize the Islamic and Ottoman past, Greek Cypriots underline the Greek and Christian Roman aspects of the island's history. As Drath explains:

Settled by Mycenaean and Achaean Greeks between the 13th and 11th centuries B.C., the island reflects their language and culture. Yet, according to the historic scenario of Turkish Cypriots, the first settlers, dating to the Stone Age between 7000 and 3900 B.C., arrived from Anatolia and Syria. The parties almost agree on the end of the Hellenistic period, when Cyprus became part of the Roman Empire, and although Turkish Cypriots emphasize the Byzantine Empire, 330–1191, with reference to the foundation of Islam [it was during the Byzantine period that the first Muslims appeared in Cyprus in 632 under the leadership of Abu-Bekir, the father-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed], Greek Cypriots dwell on Richard the Lionheart's conquest of Cyprus in 1191 and his handover of the island to his French vassal and counterpart, Guy de Lusignans [signifying the end of Byzantine, and beginning of Latin rule on the island]. (2003: 306; also see Canefe 2001, 2002, 2002a, 2004; Papadakis 2005)

The rule of Lusignans ended with the takeover of the island by the Venetians in 1489, which lasted until 1571, when the Ottomans conquered the island. With the decline of the Ottoman Empire in 1878,¹ Great Britain took over and administered the island under the provisions of a British-Ottoman defense agreement.² British rule brought with it formal equality (rights and obligations *vis-à-vis* the state) for each inhabitant of the island, an elementary electoral system (for a legislative council of locals), a greater freedom of expression (at least initially), and new grievances (between poor and rich, and between different ethnic communities), while also encouraging the growth of nationalism (*ibid.*).³

In the 1930s, with the growth of nationalism and rising anti-colonial sentiments, Greek Cypriots began to ask for *enosis*, the integration of the island with the Greek mainland. In 1955, the guerrilla movement EOKA⁴ (*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* or National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) began their struggle against British rule with the aim of annexation

of the island to Greece. The British response against the uprising was harsh, partly increasing the support of ordinary Greeks for EOKA.⁴ Although EOKA made it clear that their struggle was not aimed against the Turkish Cypriots but only against the alien colonial power, the Turkish Cypriots were still against EOKA as they were concerned about increasing violence and the possibility of being a minority in a Greek-controlled state (Akgun, *et al.* 2005). The British used these Turkish Cypriot concerns to their advantage and formed an Auxiliary Police Force made up entirely of Turkish Cypriots to fight EOKA, which further increased tensions between the two communities (*ibid.*).

In the meantime, the Turkish Cypriots began to develop the political goal of *taksim*, the division of the island between Greece and Turkey; and in order to withstand the threat from EOKA and back up this goal with force, they organized an armed underground organization of their own, *Volkan*, which later became TMT (*Türk Mukavemet Tekilatı* or Turkish Resistance Organization) (*ibid.*). Thus, an anti-colonial movement made nationality an important question for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots (and for the mainland Greeks and Turks as well). In 1959, the two motherlands along with Britain and representatives of the two Cypriot communities signed the Zurich-London Agreements, which formalized and endorsed an independent Cyprus state in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots would share power, and both *enosis* and *taksim* would be banned.

The agreements gave Cyprus its independence, and the 1960 constitution of independence provided, and still provides, for a bi-communal structure of government that anticipates the peaceful coexistence of the Greek and Turkish communities.⁵ The structure proved hard to implement, however, as neither side trusted the other. Disputes began to emerge between Greek and Turkish Cypriots within the government on a wide variety of issues including (1) foreign policy, (2) military, (3) taxation, (4) community quotas for public service posts, and (4) legislation regarding municipalities (Akgun, *et al.* 2005). In November 1963, in order to facilitate the functioning of the state, the Greek Cypriots presented a series of amendments that could easily be interpreted as an attempt to change the internal balance of power in favor of the Greek Cypriots, which would open the way to a unitary and majority Greek state without bi-communal principles. Thus, the political crisis turned into inter-communal violence when:

an angry Turkish-Cypriot crowd surrounded an armed and nervous Greek-Cypriot police patrol in Nicosia. Accounts of the confrontation differ between the Cypriot communities.... Greek Cypriot leaders characterized the fighting

following 21 December as an insurrection of Turkish-Cypriot extremists against the Republic to achieve partition, and of justified counter-measures by government forces to contain violence and rout the rebels. The Turk-Cypriot version of these same events is that the inter-communal fighting was initiated by a Greek-Cypriot offensive, in accordance with the Akritas Plan, as a result of which the main Turkish-Cypriot centers were to be occupied as a precursor to a Greek-Cypriot renoucement of the 1960 treaties and constitution, and a declaration of *enosis*. (Patrick 1976: 45)

The whole incident resulted in the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from common institutions and Turkish Cypriot abandonment of their quarters in the 72 mixed villages and 24 wholly Turkish Cypriot villages, at which point they began living in enclaves that were safe-havens in Turkish Cypriot villages or town quarters protected by the TMT forces (Patrick 1976).

In response, the United Nations sent a peacekeeping force to the island in 1964 with the following mandate: 'in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting, and as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.' The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), whose mandate was initially for a period of three months, has now been functioning with the same basic goal since 1964.

As the inter-communal violence continued, Turkey began to consider the idea of intervention to ensure the security of the Turkish Cypriot population, one of its rights as a Guarantor Power granted by the Zurich Agreement. While its first attempt at intervention in June 1964 was stopped by the United States with a harsh diplomatic letter from President Johnson,⁸ it did not stop Turkish jets from flying over the island—first firing warning shots into the sea and then bombing the island (Akgun, *et. al.*, 2005). Although a ceasefire was established and peace talks began between the two communities, between 1964 and 1967, the Cyprus crisis became one of the main sources of tension between Greece and Turkey. Violating the provisions of the Zurich-London agreements that limited the size of the Greek and Turkish military contingents stationed in Cyprus, Greek armed forces moved onto the island and inter-communal tensions intensified, while, feeling left out of the Republic's administrative, legal and political organs, the Turkish-Cypriot community set up its own institutions.

The situation began to improve in 1967 and 1968, when, following the agreements reached between Greece and Turkey, most of the Greek armed forces stationed on the island were sent back, the restrictions on the Turkish Cypriot community were lifted, and inter-communal talks began. However,

around the same time, the junta in Greece that came to power in 1967 in a military coup began to support EOKA-B—that was formed by General Grivas as a reaction to President Archbishop Makarios' deviation from the goal of *enosis*—in its efforts to annex the island to Greece. Accordingly, in July 1974, Nikos Sampson of EOKA-B, an avowed advocate of *enosis* who enjoyed the open support of the military junta, planned a coup against President Archbishop Makarios, who was perceived as taking a soft stance on reaching the ideal of *enosis*. Reacting against this evident attempt at *enosis*, Turkey conducted a military intervention/invasion invoking its rights as a Guarantor Power granted by the Zurich Agreement, and justified it on the basis of protecting the Turkish Cypriot population. In a two-part operation, taking place in July and August, Turkish military forces occupied almost 37% of the island and settled in the northern part of Cyprus.

The Turkish strategy resulted in the *de facto* partition or *taksim* of the island into northern and southern parts. The southern part is governed by the Greek Cypriots under the internationally recognized name of the Republic of Cyprus. The northern part has been governed by the Turkish Cypriots under the name of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) since its declaration in 1980, recognized only by Turkey, which still has 30,000 troops stationed on the island. The international community has brokered many peace negotiations since 1974, either in the form of high level talks, proximity talks, framework agreements, confidence building measures, sets of ideas, or peace plans—the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Plan for Cyprus is the most recent, detailed, and comprehensive attempt to resolve the Cyprus conflict (the main text totaling 141 pages plus 9,000 pages in annexes) which is foreseeing the island's partial reunification. In an island-wide referendum in April 2004, the Annan Plan was rejected in the south, with 70% voting against; in the Turkish north, 65% voted in favour of the plan despite official opposition. Regardless of the continuing conflict, the Republic of Cyprus became a member of the European Union in May 2004.

Migration in the Republic of Cyprus

The Republic of Cyprus has the highest rate of population growth among the 25 EU countries, which is explained by its particularly significant positive net migration balance as well as the rate of natural increase, which is the second largest behind Ireland (CYSTAT 2005). High net migration recorded in the last three years reaches 14,416 in 2005. Based on the information published by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus, there are

110,200 foreign residents in the Republic, constituting 12.9% of the general population (*ibid.*). According to the 2005 Passenger Survey, the number of long-term immigrants—Cypriots and foreigners arriving for settlement or for temporary employment for one year or more—has increased from 22,003 in 2004 to 24,419 (*ibid.*). For a distribution of these immigrants by their main country of citizenship, see Table I.

The Republic's transformation into a host country for immigrants is a rather recent phenomenon, as until the 1970s Cyprus was considered a country of emigration (Lenz 2005; Polykarpou 2005). There are many internal and external factors that explain this change (Trimikliniotis 2003, 2005; Polykarpou 2005). First, the Republic underwent rapid economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s that concomitantly raised demand for labour. The lack of a labour supply at the national level was only partly fulfilled by the inflow of 200,000 internally displaced Greek Cypriots from the north who had to leave their homes as a result of the 1974 Turkish invasion. Thus, the lack of a national labor supply paved the way for the influx of immigrant workers. In the 1990s, the demand for cheap immigrant labour continued, this time due to the lower growth rate of the economy, an increase in inflation, the fear of further inflationary pressures, and pressure from employers to reduce labour costs. Furthermore, the low unemployment rate along with full and stable employment for Cypriot workers also increased immigration.

The external factors that explain the Republic's changing role from a home to host country are manifold. First, because of the civil war in Lebanon, Beirut's role as a Middle Eastern hub ended, and the economically developed Republic of Cyprus became the new target for those looking for new opportunities. Second, the collapse of the regimes in Eastern Europe resulted in the deregulation of investments in countries such as Cyprus increasing foreign investments in the south of the island. Third, a large number of Pontian Greeks from the Caucasus were granted Greek nationality and were thus able to enter Cyprus without difficulty. Finally, the Gulf war, successive crises in the Gulf region, and unrest in Israel/Palestine caused the inflow of both economic and political refugees from the affected countries.

According to the Chief of the Cyprus Police, Charalambos Koulentis, there is one more factor that contributes to the increase in illegal immigrants. Mr. Koulentis claims that a major flow of illegal immigrants is taking place through Turkey to Northern Cyprus from the Occupied Territories, and that Ankara does not cooperate with the Republic of Cyprus on this issue nor with the international community (CNA 2007). Thus, lack of communication

and cooperation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot administrations does not allow for developing a regional migration policy.

In spite of its increasing role as a host country, for many years the policy of the Republic of Cyprus regarding the employment of immigrants has been constraining and has only allowed non-Cypriots to take executive positions and a small number of highly skilled managerial and technical positions (Trimikliniotis 2003, 2005). Non-Cypriots were given work permits only in exceptional circumstances and on the condition that there were no Cypriots with the required qualifications (*ibid.*).

Legally, aliens can make an application to obtain an Immigration Permit on account of one of the six categories referred to in Regulation 5 of the Aliens and Immigration Regulations of 1972. Nobody can get an Immigration Permit unless the Immigration Control Board verifies to the Minister of the Interior that the person belongs to one of the following categories:

Category A: Persons who intend to work as self employed in agriculture, cattle breeding, bird breeding or fish culture in the Republic provided that they have in their possession adequate land or a permit to acquire it, that they have fully and freely at their disposal capital of CY£250,000, and that such employment should not negatively affect the general economy of the Republic.

Category B: Persons who intend to work as self employed in mining enterprises in the Republic provided that they have in their possession a relative permit, that they have fully and freely at their disposal capital of CY£200,000, and that such employment should not negatively affect the general economy of the Republic.

Category C: Persons who intend to work as self employed in a trade or profession in the Republic, provided that they have in their possession a relative permit, that they have fully and freely at their disposal capital of CY£150,000, and that such employment should not affect negatively the general economy of the Republic.

Category D: Persons who intend to work as self employed in a profession or science in the Republic provided that they have academic or professional qualifications for which there is demand in Cyprus. Possession of adequate funds is also necessary.

Category E: Persons who have been offered permanent employment in the Republic which will not create undue local competition.

Category F: Persons who possess and have fully and freely at their disposal a secure annual income high enough to give them a decent living in Cyprus without having to engage in any business, trade or profession. The annual income required should be at least CY£5,600 for a single applicant and at least CY£2,700 for every dependent person, but the Immigration Control Board may demand additional amounts as necessary. Most applicants come under this Category, the majority of them being pensioners or retired persons.¹⁰

The government policy regarding immigration is based on outdated legislation and *ad hoc* ministerial decisions, and was developed around the idea that immigrants would stay in Cyprus only for short term employment to satisfy the need for a specific type of labour (ECRI 2005: 31). Authorities claim that there are only temporary migrants in Cyprus, and try to avoid policies that would enable their active participation and full integration in the country's labour market and social life. Policymakers have not contemplated ways to encourage civic participation of migrants and help them develop a sense of belonging. (Trimiklionitis & Demetriou 2005). 'The debate on multiculturalism has begun only recently, but this is still at an infancy stage and is more geared towards *acceptance* and *tolerance* rather than *civic participation*, which, as a concept, is located at a stage several steps ahead from tolerance (*ibid.*: 4).' Action for Equality, Support and Antiracism in Cyprus (KISA), a non-governmental organization, established in 1998 as a result of the concern about the conditions of entry, stay and employment of migrants, states that there is a lack of a comprehensive migration policy, and escalating incidents of xenophobia, discrimination and racism on the island.¹¹

Even legal immigrants face problems in the Republic, such as violation of their labour and trade union rights—e.g., in Cyprus the standard contract prepared by the immigration authorities for the employment of migrant domestic helpers prohibits the employee from having any participation in any political or trade union activity, which is in violation of Article 21 of the Cyprus Constitution which guarantees freedom of assembly and association including the right to form and to join trade unions, and which applies to Cypriots and non-Cypriots alike, as well as the new laws transposing EU Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC that prohibit any discrimination on the grounds of national or ethnic origin in terms of employment, including participation in trade unions (EUMC 2006: 51). Moreover, the issue of healthcare coverage and transfer of their social insurance rights to their countries of origin are also problems that migrants face in the Republic of Cyprus. In short:

Overall, the situation in Cyprus on the level of civic participation of migrants can be described as rather disappointing. There are institutional barriers such as 'restrictive conditions' that prohibit political participation in elections (restrictions in voting, standing for office), unless full citizenship is granted. There are no formal prohibitions of membership in parties and organizations, rights for self-organization and public rallies, although this has not caused migrant workers to participate in trade unions en masse. Formal rights guaranteed under the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights

are generally respected. Nevertheless migrants face, on the whole, a hostile environment and racial discrimination in society and an unsympathetic immigration regime based on controlling, but ultimately failing to control the growth of migration. (Trimiklionitis & Demetriou 2005: 4)

Recent studies on migration argue against the negative popular views of migration—e.g., that immigration causes loss of jobs for the members of the host communities—by revealing that migrants are not a threat to host societies, but conversely, are usually vulnerable groups, and that there is a need to end discrimination and other acts of injustice committed against migrants and pursue democratic migration policies (Kleinschmidt 2006). The empirical evidence on the situation of immigrants in the Republic of Cyprus proves this point. Generally, immigrant workers take on manual, unskilled, low-paid and low-prestige jobs that are not appealing to Cypriots (see Table II). Thus, the argument that immigration causes loss of jobs for Cypriots is baseless. Moreover, in order to be able to legally enter Cyprus, immigrants must have been offered a specific job for which no Cypriot could be found. A noteworthy number of the immigrants in the Republic are employed in seasonal jobs, put up with labour exploitation, and live under hard conditions. Based on the country report on Cyprus by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), especially in the case of female domestic workers, adverse working conditions, isolation, and further labour abuses like sexual exploitation, turn immigrant workers to a vulnerable group (ECRI 2005: 32). A predominantly tricky sector where ‘slave-trade’ conditions prevail, labour and social insurance legislation is severely violated, and control mechanisms are non-existent is the ‘sex industry’ in which women admitted into Cyprus under the category of ‘performing artists’ work mainly in nightclubs and cabarets as prostitutes (*ibid.*).¹²

Domestic Political Life in the Republic of Cyprus

Based on the information published by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus, the population of Cyprus was estimated to be 854,300 at the end of 2005 (compared to 837,300 at the end of the previous year), of whom 766,400 live in the territories under the control of the Republic. Taking into consideration the size of its population in comparison to the number of political parties in Cyprus, I believe ‘vivid’ is an accurate way to describe the domestic politics of the Republic. According to the Press and Information Office on the official Government Web Portal of Cyprus, there are eleven political parties in the Republic of Cyprus and six have seats in the current parliament (see Table III).

The following section looks at the background and programme of each of the six parties in the parliament of the Republic in order to understand different positions on the issue of migration within the domestic political scene of the south. The findings show that despite the problems addressed in the above section, immigration is not an issue area for the political parties in the south, as bigger issues of the Cyprus problem and the EU membership dominate politics and public opinion. Migration seems to be an issue taken on by trade unions.

I begin my analysis with the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL), which came into existence in 1941 succeeding the Communist Party of Cyprus.¹³ As the oldest organized political force involved in current island politics, the historical background of AKEL parallels the historical background of Cyprus in general. The official AKEL account of Cypriot history is full of 'struggles'. Before independence in 1960, *struggle* against colonization to gain democratic freedoms and the *struggle* against fascism were among the main activities of AKEL. Following the 1960 declaration of independence AKEL *struggled* to defend the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus from foreign conspiracies that culminated with the fascist *coup d'état* of July 1974 by the Greek Junta and the terrorist organization EOKA-B, and the Turkish invasion that followed; and today AKEL is *struggling* to bring about the end of the Turkish occupation and the reunification of Cyprus and its people.

AKEL defines itself as the Party of the Cypriot working people and advocates the brotherhood of Greek and Turkish Cypriots within the framework of a leftist movement—AKEL is the only political party in the south that has a website translated into Turkish besides English. However, comparing the rhetoric and the action of the party can sometimes lead to confusion. For example, despite its stance on the Cyprus problem—that it should be solved on the basis of the UN Resolutions and the High-level agreements and within the framework of the UN, and that Cyprus should be a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, with a single sovereignty, single international personality, and single citizenship, with the human rights and freedoms of all Cypriots guaranteed—on the April 2004 referendum AKEL called on the people to vote *against* the Annan Plan.

Moreover, although AKEL publicly announces its stance on big issues such as Cyprus' EU membership or the demilitarization of the island—referring to both the Turkish and the British bases on the island, AKEL supports the dismantling of the foreign bases in Cyprus—it does not provide any policy stance on immigration. As a party of the left on the island, one would expect to see at least some mention of the topic of immigrant labour, but AKEL's party programme offers none.

The Democratic Rally, DISY, was founded on 4 July 1976 by Glafcos Clerides, the first Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Representative of the Greek Cypriot community at the inter-communal talks between 1968 and 1976, 'with a view to establish a proper and normal political system, safeguard the democratic rights of the whole population and help to achieve a fair and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem benefiting both communities.'¹⁵ The Democratic Rally adheres to the western ideals of democracy, freedom and justice; its ideology is based on Christian Democratic values; it believes in the development of the individual, in the family as the most important foundation of the Cypriot society, and in the community as the nucleus of the state; it advocates a social market economy as an economic and social model that fosters individual freedom and self-responsibility and provides social justice for all human beings based on solidarity and equality of opportunities; supports less state involvement in the economy and a greater social role for the state with a view to achieving social cohesion; and strongly believes that the future of Cyprus lies within Europe. However, like AKEL, DISY does not publicly announce its stance on immigration.

As a social democratic party, the Movement of Social Democrats (EDEK) declares its primary objectives as peace, freedom, equality, redistribution of income, social solidarity, progress and prosperity in a just society within which issues regarding people, quality of life, the environment, the right to work, health, education and culture are at the forefront.¹⁶ They advocate a transparent democratic dialogue where citizens join in the decision-making procedures of representative democracy. Their primary objectives are to liberate Cyprus from Turkish occupation; to secure a solution to the Cyprus problem which guarantees conditions of freedom for the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, free from racist and other discriminatory policies, which violate human rights and fundamental freedoms; a free market, but with a supervisory role for the state to prevent inequalities, social injustice and environmental degradation; coherent research that will establish firm economic arguments at the European level and sound political economic policies at the national level; to rebuild the education system so that it will respond to the needs of the 21st Century such as the necessity for knowledge and skilled labour while preserving the national and cultural identity of Cypriots. EDEK also does not provide any hints of its policy on immigration in its party programme.

Founded in 2005, the European Party secured 5.75% of the votes in the May 2006 parliamentary elections, gaining three seats in the House of Representatives. As can be inferred from its name, the European Party

believes that the solution to the Cyprus problem should be compatible with the European *acquis* and based on the UN resolutions as well as human rights; advocates the closer involvement of the EU in the peace building process to make sure that the European principle of abolishing artificial divisions is respected and that both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots live together on a united island without any ethnic or other segregation.

Established in 1996, the Cyprus Green Party has the soundest political platform with regards to specific policy areas.¹⁷ Like the rest of the political parties in the Republic, the Green Party is also against the Turkish occupation of 37% of the island and its resulting suppression of the basic human rights of the people of Cyprus, and declares it as the biggest environmental crime against Cyprus. The Greens are against the geographical division of Cyprus on the basis of ethnic origin or religion, and define it as racist and therefore unacceptable from a historical, political, social and therefore ecological point of view. Not surprisingly, ecological issues are the major policy area for the Green Party: The protection of the Akamas Peninsula, a place of unique ecological value that is threatened mainly by the continuation of military exercises by British Forces and the uncontrolled tourist development especially along the coastline; the prevention of the building of a nuclear power plant on the south coast of Turkey (an earthquake sensitive area), which would expose all eastern Mediterranean countries to the dangers of nuclear wastes and accidents; an integral and long term national policy of water resource management where water shortage in Cyprus is a severe problem; resolution of the traffic congestion problems in cities; the encouragement of mass recycling (paper, glass, batteries) by local governments; the reduction and ultimately the banning of hunting in Cyprus through legal measures and ecological education.

Other parties did not present any policies regarding migration policy either. Most did not present *any* novel policy regarding *any* topic. For example, a party of the center, United Democrats (EDI), that was founded in 1996 when the Movement of Free Democrats (KED) led by former president George Vassiliou and the Democratic Socialist Reform Movement (ADISOK) decided to join together, advocates the creation of a federation and a settlement of the Cyprus problem based on UN resolutions. European Democracy (EURO.DI), which is a centre right party founded in 2004 following the results of the April 24 referendum and the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union, supports a settlement of the Cyprus question on the basis of European principles, and in particular, the Constitution for Europe and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Eleptheroi Polites, which was also founded in 2004, claims to fight for the defense of

democracy that is defined by the party programme as freedom, social justice, equality, vision and hope. Fighting Democratic Movement (ADIK), another centre right party established in 1999 whose president was formerly a member of the Democratic Party, does not stand for anything particularly novel, but supports an independent and united Cyprus and a settlement of the Cyprus problem based on UN resolutions and the European *acquis*.

Thus, none of the parties above have presented concrete policies regarding the immigration policy of the Republic of Cyprus. In reality, maybe with the exception of the Greens, none of the parties holding a seat in the parliament seem to differ much from each other in any issue area. Looking at the two main issues for all the parties, which are the solution to the Cyprus problem and the EU membership, it seems that there is a general trend to advocate a solution based on UN resolutions—and most of these parties *were against* the Annan Plan—and there is a universally positive attitude towards EU membership. Despite some common rhetoric about justice for human beings, equal opportunity, democracy, and the fight against racism, the political parties largely overlook the problems of immigrants in the Republic.

Trade Unions

During the 24th All-Cyprus Congress of the Cyprus Workers' Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Cyprus (SEK) held in 1997, the delegates stated their apprehension over the large numbers of legally or illegally employed foreign workers in Cyprus. The main reason for their concern was their belief that it was the inflow of foreign labour that caused the steady rise of unemployment. However, despite these negative reactions in the 1990s, trade unions score better than political parties in tackling the issue of immigration. To illustrate, the Pancyprian Federation of Labor (PEO) has been an active participant within the public debates on the part played by migrant workers in the Cypriot economy and in society as a whole. In his speech on May Day, General Secretary of the PEO Pambis Kyritsis warned his brothers and sisters of Cypriot employers and domestic capital that are intensifying their effort to deregulate labour relations and undermine collective agreements (2007). He asserts:

They are fully exploiting today's conditions offered by the possibility of the free movement of working people in the European Union. They are trying to use immigrant workers not just for exploitation as cheap labor but to use immigrant workers also as a means of undermining collective agreements and working people's rights (*ibid.*).

And calls on the immigrant workers:

Regarding European and other immigrant workers in Cyprus, on the occasion of Workers May Day we address a brotherly trade union militant greeting. We call on them to embrace their Trade Unions, to get organized and join their ranks and become a part of the movement so that they will be in a stronger position to protect their interests and rights (*ibid.*).

Thus, PEO is at least fully aware of the existence of an immigrant community in the south of the island, and it is searching for possibilities to gain their cooperation and to organize them, which is a rather difficult task due to (1) the lack of a tradition of union activity and organization in certain sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, (2) opposition from employers, (3) political apathy, and (4) difficulty in joining the unions experienced by seasonal workers (Trimikliniotis 2003).

Both PEO and SEK have a positive approach to migrant workers, and they are aware of and concerned about the problems regarding them, but lack the power to push employer organizations and to implement a new system (*ibid.*). Not surprisingly, employer organizations support a liberal policy concerning the employment of migrant workers due to their lower labour costs, contributing to the introduction of a cheap foreign labour force (*ibid.*). Given the temporary and elastic nature of government policy on immigration, the employers enjoy the ability to avoid the principle of equal treatment for immigrant workers with relative ease.

However, the fact that labour unions support policies for the benefits of immigrant workers does not mean that *all* Cypriot workers are positive about immigrants. To illustrate:

Tensions mounted in the hotel industry during April 2007 arising from workers' concerns regarding employment practices in relation to migrant labor. The workers fear that the poorer terms and conditions of employment for migrant workers, compared with those provided for under the industry-wide collective agreement will result in a gradual exclusion of the local labor force (Soumeli 2007).

Migration in the TRNC

As in the south, the problem of solving the Cyprus question also dominates the political landscape in the north. However, there is a more lively political debate on the issue of immigration in the north that developed around policies regarding immigrants from mainland Turkey, who are also called

as the Anatolian settlers. This debate is not only confined to the north, but is also widely discussed in the south, as the Greek Cypriots see the influx of Turkish immigrants to the island as a threat to the demographic balance of which they make up a majority. In case of a solution to the Cyprus problem, the future of these settlers who were mostly allocated housing and land of the Greek Cypriot internally displaced people of 1974 constitutes an important agenda item within peace negotiations.

However, although the issue of Turkish migrants preoccupies the political landscape on both sides of the island, not even the exact figure of the phenomenon is known. Based on the information published by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus, there are 'pronounced differences between the population in the Government controlled area and the Turkish Cypriot community in the Turkish occupied area' as '(w)hile the population in the Government controlled area increased gradually since 1977 at a rate which ranged between 0.7% and 2.7%, in the Turkish occupied area, on the contrary, the Turkish Cypriot community has been decreasing since 1986 (CYSTAT 2005).' Considering that both the fertility and mortality of Turkish Cypriots are similar to those of the rest of the Cyprus population, this difference in population growth could only be explained by migration movements—emigration of an estimated 58,000 Turkish Cypriots and immigration of illegal settlers from Turkey, whose number ranges from 150 to 160 thousand (*ibid.*).

These numbers were estimated based on information of significant arrivals of Turks in the occupied area. Hatay argues that such estimations based on the net arrival-departure balance and projections of Turkish Cypriot birth rate are flawed (2005). These estimations do not take into account the facts that: Arrival-departure balance also includes temporary residents (e.g., students, migrant workers, Turkish army personnel, etc.), and TRNC citizens—irrespective of ethnic origin—who travel with Turkish travel documents, but excludes persons who arrived as Turkish nationals, and having received TRNC citizenship, departed with TRNC travel documents. Therefore, Hatay claims, such high assessments for the number of Turkish settlers ranging from 117,000 to 130,000 are to a great extent overstated (2005). Using census data from 1996 with updates and electoral lists as alternative and more authoritative measures, he estimates the total number of TRNC citizens of Turkish mainland origin currently residing in northern Cyprus to be between 32,000 and 35,000 including their offspring, which makes up 16.8% and 18.4% of 190,000 TRNC citizens (*ibid.*). For the year 2005, the total number of Turkish originated temporary residents (non-citizens) was estimated at about 102,000, distributed as 16,277 registered workers and non-registered

workers, 1,695 tourists (on average at any particular time), 18,398 university students, 500 lecturers, and an estimated 35,000 Turkish army personnel with families and conscripts.

Although it might be relieving for the Greek Cypriots and the leftist parties of the TRNC to hear that the number of Turkish settlers is not as great as they assume, it does not improve the precarious situation of immigrants on the island. Despite the fact that the chances for settlement of the Cyprus problem in the near future are quite low, in any peace settlement, the immigrants would be among the first to leave their homes on the island due to provisions on property repatriation. Knowing this, the right wing political parties are manipulating their support for their own purposes. Thus, the immigrants in the north are as vulnerable as their counterparts in the south.

Domestic Political Life in the TRNC

The domestic political life in the north of the island is no less vibrant than in the south. Despite its much smaller population—the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Public Information Office declares that the population in the Northern Cyprus is 256,207—there are eleven active political parties in the north.²⁰ However, four political parties have been dominating Turkish Cypriot politics in the post-1974 period and in the latest parliamentary elections (see Table IV). These are the National Unity Party (UBP), the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), the Communal Liberation Party (TKP)—now the Communal Democracy Party (TDP), and the more recent Democratic Party (DP). As brief research on their party programmes shows, political parties in the north differ quite radically in their positions on the subject of immigration, i.e., the status of immigrants from mainland Turkey.

Founded in 1975 by the founder and the former president of the TRNC Rauf Denktaş, the conservative National Unity Party (UBP) has been in power for most of the period since then, occasionally as a coalition partner.²¹ UBP's policies are usually in accordance with the policies of Turkey regarding Cyprus. UBP's 'No' campaign before the April 2004 referendum for the Annan Plan is maybe the first time that it was not acting in parallel with the mainland Turkish government, which was in support of the plan. In the recent parliamentary elections in 2005, UBP won 31.7% of the popular vote and 19 out of 50 seats, and came out as the second-largest party. UBP is considered by the Greek Cypriots in the south as a shadow organization of mainland Turkey that is trying to colonize the island. They also believe that an extensive source of support for the UBP comes from the Turkish immigrants in the north also known as the settlers. The empirical findings

prove their latter claim as the UBP has strong support in the settler villages (Hatay 2005).

In 1992, resembling the emergence of some other current but mainly trivial political parties, the Democratic Party (DP) grew out of divisions in the UBP. In the following year, it merged with a party of settlers/immigrants from Turkey, the New Birth Party. The leader of the DP is Serdar Denktash, the son of the former TRNC president Rauf Denktash, whose considerable influence within the party and partiality towards it—even more so than his former UBP party—are well known. In fact, the party programmes of the UBP and DP are almost identical.

Established in 1970, as an opposition to the policies of Rauf Denktash, the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) is the oldest Turkish Cypriot party and is a traditionally left-wing party that is largely supported by Turkish Cypriots themselves. With the collapse of communism, the party changed its stance from Soviet prone communism to a European social democratic line.²³ Historically, the CTP was considered *the* opposition in the north. Unlike UBP, CTP is in favour of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation in Cyprus with a relatively close relationship between the federated states and a strong central government; the continuation of Turkey's guarantees; the stationing of an adequate number of Turkish soldiers in Cyprus; rapprochement and the implementation of confidence-building measures, which, according to the party, will contribute positively to the development of the Turkish Cypriot economy; the settlement of the property issue based on a moratorium; negotiations for a solution of the Cyprus question in the framework of the high-level agreements; and the preservation and development of the *Cypriot* character of the population of Cyprus. And unlike UBP, it is against the status quo in Cyprus and the efforts for recognition of the TRNC, against the idea of integration or even closer relations with Turkey, against a partition of the island between Greece and Turkey that would end the Turkish Cypriot right to establish their own government, and most relevant to this discussion, against the *continuing* immigration of people from mainland Turkey and the uncontrolled granting of citizenship, as this changes the demographic structure of the island, raises the level of unemployment forcing Turkish Cypriots to emigrate, and provides Turkey with the opportunity to intervene in the internal affairs of the Turkish Cypriot community. I have italicized 'continuing' to underline that, being aware of the humanitarian side of the problem, CTP does not support sending of all Turkish immigrants back to Turkey. Realizing that some of these people have been living in the north since the 1970s, CTP recognize their right to stay on the island, but is against the further influx of people from Turkey.

Recently born out of the merger of the social democratic Communal Liberation Party (TKP), which was founded in 1976, and the Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH), which had been a joint movement of political parties, trade unions and representatives of civil society since 2003, the Communal Democracy Party (TDP) is aiming at self-governance for Turkish Cypriots, in a peaceful, free, welfare state where Turkish Cypriot identity and communal being are protected. With certain exceptions such as advocating a complete demilitarization of the island, TDP's stance in general is similar to that of CTP in that it underlines a common Cypriot identity, communication between the two communities of the island, the problem of Turkey's excessive involvement in Turkish Cypriot politics, and the problem of uncontrolled granting of citizenship to Turkish immigrants. The fight against illegal inflow of workers is also included in TDP's party programme.

Conclusion

Another physical division of Nicosia, is the walls; the wall city. Who lives inside the wall city? The Greek Cypriot side is populated by migrants, mostly men, who come to work and mostly women from Eastern Europe and Russia who work as prostitutes. In the north side we have mostly Turkish migrants who live in the old town. These people are completely marginalized in both sides living in the margins of poverty and exploitation (Papadakis in Coulombis & Savvides 2004: 54–55).

Neither of the sides in Cyprus score very high in terms of their policies towards migrants. The migration policy of the south, which is rooted in a model of economic exploitation, is not very coherent and/or institutionalized, and can hardly tackle the problem with the increasing inflow of people to this island where opportunities abound. One positive development for immigrants in the south is the Republic's recent EU membership that has increased the visibility of their problems due to close EU scrutiny of its member states. Still, migrants have limited sources for political expression, and none of the political parties seem to be willing to embark on this task. Considering the *de facto* partition and the general political climate in the island, this is not very surprising. To illustrate, it is hard to expect Greek Cypriots to easily grant citizenship to immigrants when they are continuously criticizing their Turkish Cypriot counterparts for altering the demographics of the island by granting citizenships to settlers from mainland Turkey.

The immigrants in the north seem to be in a somewhat better situation as they are better endowed to lobby in the political landscape as most of them have TRNC citizenships, but in reality, the immigrants in the north are also in a precarious situation. Although a group of political parties are

exploiting them for political support for now, the Turkish settlers are among the first to leave their homes that were granted to them 30 years ago due to property repatriation claims in case of a political settlement of the Cyprus question. They will face an identity crisis both factually and metaphorically.

However, none of these problems are unique to Cyprus. Unfortunately, empirical research shows that despite the positive contribution of migrants to regional integration, governments have been incapable of adopting a common migration policy and are unwilling to tackle long-term problems (Shuto, Herz, Takashi in Kleinschmidt 2006). Moreover, empirical research also reveals that although migrants make important contributions to their home communities, they can only have a minor influence on their host communities (Maegawa in Kleinschmidt 2006).

What is unique to Cyprus is that on an island that has been divided along ethnic lines for the last three decades, with rather discouraging attitudes prevailing on both sides towards their 'immigrant others', it is quite hard to imagine a melting pot of different identities if a settlement were to be reached. Historically, Cyprus has never had unity among its different communities, and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities have always lived *together yet separately*. The hope for the immigrants of Cyprus is to find a little space within that togetherness for themselves while not expecting unity.

Table 1. Immigration to the Republic of Cyprus by main country of citizenship, 2003

	2003
Total Immigration	16,779
Nationals	1,994
Non-Nationals	14,785
of which	
EU Nationals (EU 15)	7,884
Nationals of 10 EU Accession States	390
Non-EU 25 Nationals	6,511
Most important Non-EU 25 Nationals	
Russian Federation	1,594
Sri Lanka	654
Philippines	504
Bulgaria	444
Syrian Arab Republic	356
China	348
India	327
Ukraine	279
Romania	246
South Africa	210
Other Non-EU 25 Nationals	1,549

Source: GeDAP/Eurostat 2006 in EC (2006).

Table 2. A general profile of immigrants in the Republic of Cyprus

Country of Origin	Characteristics
Bulgaria	Employed in tourism, Women trafficking for the sex industry.
The Dominican Republic	Women trafficking for the sex industry.
Egypt	Employed in the services, agriculture and industry as skilled or unskilled workers, Men predominantly employed in the construction industry.
India	Two thirds (mostly woman) employed as domestic workers, The rest in agriculture and livestock farming.
Jordan	Highly skilled jobs.
Lebanon	Highly skilled jobs.
Moldavia	Employed in tourism, Women trafficking for the sex industry.
The Philippines	Two thirds (mostly woman) employed as domestic workers, The rest in agriculture and livestock farming. Women trafficking for the sex industry.
Romania	Employed in tourism, Women trafficking for the sex industry.
Sri Lanka	Two thirds (mostly woman) employed as domestic workers, The rest in agriculture and livestock farming.
Syria	Employed in the services, agriculture and industry as skilled or unskilled workers, Men predominantly employed in the construction industry.

Sources: The CIA World Fact Book, Trimiklionitis (2003, 2005).

Table 3. Greek Cypriot Political Parties in Parliamentary Elections

Party	2006	Seats	2001	Seats
Progressive Party of Working People, AKEL (Communist)	31.1%	18	34.7%	20
Democratic Rally, DISY (Right)	30.3%	18	34.0%	19
Democratic Party, DIKO (Centrist)	17.9%	11	14.8%	9
Movement of Social Democrats, EDEK (Social-Democrats)	8.9%	5	6.5%	4
European Party, EURO.KO (Centrist)	5.8%	3	5.2%	2
Ecological and Environmental Movement (Green)	2.0%	1	2.0%	1
United Democrats, EDI (Liberal)	1.6%	—	2.6%	1
Others	2.4%	—	0.2%	—
Turkish community / vacant seats		24		24
Total Seats		80		80
Turnout	89.0%		91.8%	

Source: Parties & Elections in Europe: The database about parliamentary elections and political parties in Europe at <http://www.parties-and-elections.de/index.html>.

Table 4. Turkish Cypriot Political Parties in Parliamentary Elections of 2003 and 2005

Party	2005	Seats	2003	Seats
Republican Turkish Party (CTP)-United Forces, (Social democrats)	44.5%	24	35.2%	19
National Unity Party, UBP (Conservative)	31.7%	19	32.9%	18
Democratic Party, DP (Conservative)	13.5%	6	12.9%	7
Communal Democracy Party, TDP (Socialist)	5.8%	1	13.2%	6
Others	4.5		5.8	
Total seats		50		50
Turnout	80.8%		—	

Source: Parties & Elections in Europe: The database about parliamentary elections and political parties in Europe at <http://www.parties-and-elections.de/index.html>.

Notes

1. The decline is marked with the first time that the Ottoman Empire lost territory, which was with the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) signed at the end of the Battle of Vienna. From this date onwards, the Empire continued losing territory, the most important for the sake of this argument being a result of Greek independence in 1832, which was a spur of Hellenic national consciousness also among the Greeks of Cyprus.
2. The island formally remained under Ottoman rule until 1914 when the British annexed the island after the Ottoman Empire entered World War I allied with Germany.
3. From 1923 onwards, with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's grand project of creating a Turkish nation, nationalism also found roots among Turkish Cypriots, although the island was not a part of the new Turkish Republic.
4. For those who are interested in the period under British rule just before independence, two very controversial accounts by Durrell (1957) and Montis (2004) would be of interest.
5. The same agreements also bestowed Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom special rights as Guarantor Powers. Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee stated: 'In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty,

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.'

6. On 21 April 1966 a pro-Grivas (founder and leader of EOKA) Greek newspaper *Patris*—whose aim was to show the mishandling of the Greek 'national cause' by Archbishop Makarios and his associates—published a top secret document, the famous Akritas Plan, written by Greek Cypriot leaders and Greek Army officers in 1963, consisting of the exposition of a method by which *enosis* was to be pursued (Stravnides 1976). The document was, and still is, treated by Turkish Cypriots as the true face of the Greek Cypriot leadership.
7. Security Council Resolution 186 (1964), Paragraph 5.
8. The letter dated 5 June 1964 stated that the Turkish military intervention would lead to a clash with Greece, cause violent repercussions, ruin any hope of UN assistance in settling the island crisis, and cause the slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots (Ball 1983). President Johnson also threatened Turkey by stating: 'I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention, without the full consent and understanding NATO allies. And unless I can have your assurance that you will not take such action without further and fullest consultation, I cannot accept your injunction to Ambassador Hare [the US ambassador in Ankara at the time] of secrecy, and I must immediately ask for emergency meetings of the NATO council and the UN Security Council ... (*ibid.*).'
9. While the Turks and Turkish Cypriots would argue that the 1974 military operation was an intervention undertaken on humanitarian grounds (actually many call it a peace operation), the Greeks and most of the international literature on the subject calls it an invasion. Also, when Greek Cypriots refer to the North of the island, they call it the 'occupied territories.'
10. The Republic of Cyprus Government Web Portal at <http://www.cyprus.gov.cy>.
11. For the official website of the Action for Equality, Support and Antiracism in Cyprus, KISA, visit <http://www.kisa.org.cy/EN/index.html>.
12. For an interesting account of migrant sex workers see Lenz (2005).
13. For the official website of AKEL, visit <http://www.akel.org.cy/English/akel.html>.
14. Since 1995, AKEL has changed its negative stance on Cyprus' EU membership and has begun to support it on the grounds that the process of accession could influence the seeking of a solution to the Cyprus problem positively, for two reasons: (1) the EU could boost the security feeling in both communities, and (2) membership was an objective shared by most members of both communities. See Resolution of 18th Congress (16–19/11/95) at <http://www.akel.org.cy/English/eu.html>.

15. For the official website of Democratic Rally, visit <http://www.disy.org.cy/#>.
16. For the official website of EDEK, visit <http://www.edek.org.cy/index.php>.
17. For the official website of the Green Party, visit <http://www.cyprusgreens.org>, an English website is available at <http://leonardo.spidernet.net/Gaia/251/>, but it is not updated frequently.
18. For the official website of the Cyprus Workers' Confederation, visit <http://www.sek.org.cy>.
19. For an analysis of the possible relationship between unemployment and foreign labour in Cyprus, see Trimikliniotis (2006).
20. For a list and contact information of the political parties in the North, visit <http://www.trncpio.org/>.
21. For the official website of the National Unity Party, visit <http://www.ulusalbirlikpartisi.com/>.
22. For the official website of the Democratic Party, visit <http://www.serdardenktas.com/index.html>.
23. 'For a long time, the CTP maintained close links with its 'comrades and compatriots' in the Greek-Cypriot communist party AKEL. However, during the 1990s, relations between the two became increasingly strained. For AKEL, the CTP's willingness in the mid-1990s to abandon its position as an opposition party and enter into the government of what Greek Cypriots in general see as a 'pseudo-state' on 'Turkish-occupied territories'—and, moreover, in coalition with the adamantly pro-Denktaş DP—was hard to stomach. The CTP had similar digestive difficulties when AKEL formed a coalition government with the right-wing DIKO, led by Tassos Papadopoulos, following the latter's election as president of the Republic of Cyprus in February 2003 (Hatay 2005: 18).'
24. For the official website of the Communal Democracy Party, visit <http://www.toplumcudemokrasipartisi.com/>.

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