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Framing Syrians in Turkey: State Control and No Crisis Discourse

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ABSTRACT

The mass arrival of Syrian refugees and their continuing presence have triggered many new debates regarding migration in Turkey, which – as a result of its open-door policy – now hosts the highest number of refugees in the world. Yet, when we investigate the ways political institutions and actors have framed migration, we observe, unlike in European discourses, the complete absence of the word "crisis". In public statements by politicians, "control" emerges instead as a recurrent (albeit implicit) theme. Here, management of the refugee issue becomes a sign of state power, exercised through various mechanisms. Through analysis of state discourse on Syrians in the Turkish media, we find that crisis framing has been deliberately avoided, which we contend is a sign of an implicit "silencing" via media control. This choice of discourse reflects a clear policy to manage public reactions to the mass arrival of refugees.

INTRODUCTION[1.]

The intensification of irregular crossings of Syrian asylum seekers via the Aegean Sea from 2011 to 2015 was described across the European Union (hereafter, the EU) as a "crisis". Some believed that this was a justified description of events because even though similar-sized flows to the EU had been observed before, none of them resembled this one. Heisbourg (2015: 7) argued that "the current flow of refugees is not unprecedented in numerical terms, nor from the standpoint of its consequences –human, strategic or otherwise… [But there] is no precedent for such a large and abrupt flow of war refugees from the Middle East to Europe". For others, describing the event as a crisis merely exaggerated matters and placed the theme in a highly Eurocentric frame (Heck and Hess, 2017). Discourses on migration in Turkey – even when referring to the same events – differ markedly when compared to those of the EU countries. When Turkish discourses are analysed, if there is a crisis at all, it is somewhere else – in Europe, in Syria, but never in Turkey. Indeed, discourses around migration in Turkey since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis consistently emphasize control at home and crisis abroad: Turkey is strong and in this large and important country, everything is always under control.

Since the outbreak of Syria's horrific civil war in March 2011, Turkey has followed an "open-door" policy towards refugees from the conflict. This "liberal" policy has been complemented by a "humanitarian discourse" concerning the admission and accommodation of the refugees (Koca, 2015: 209, Koca, 2016: 57).[2.] As a consequence, Turkey's policies have been broadly acclaimed and well received both domestically and internationally. Yet, as Koca argues (2015: 209), the stated

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"open-door" approach and its limitations have not been subject to critical scrutiny – a glaring omission since refugees fleeing Syria have been governed "in a security framework embedding exclusionary, militarized and technologized border practices; in other words, they have been securitized". From a different angle, Bélanger and Saraçoğlu (2018: 279) note the typical depiction in the academic literature on Syrian refugee migration in Turkey of it being yet another "refugee" or "migration crisis" that demands efficient management from the international community and the Turkish state. Contrasting most interpretations that portray the flow of Syrian refugees into Turkey as the source of a demographic and humanitarian crisis, they stress "the role of Turkish foreign policy both in the exodus of Syrians from their country and their 'containment' on Turkish soil" (ibid.).

In fact, as the number of Syrians in Turkey has steadily increased, many commentators and experts have been puzzled by the general absence of social turmoil and an electorate backlash against the refugees. Hoffmann and Samuk (2016: 4) note how remarkable it is "that Syrian immigration has not led to a moral panic in Turkey and has in fact not even become a particularly salient issue in domestic politics". Fisunoğlu and Sert (2019) show how, during the 2015 general elections, the presence of Syrians had no effect on electoral behaviour and that, statistically speaking, socio-economic indicators offer a better explanation of the outcome.

Turkey has since 2011 become host to the largest refugee population in the world, with direct consequences on migration management. The mass arrival of Syrian refugees and their continuing presence have triggered many new debates. The significant issues that have attracted media attention can be grouped under topics such as return, integration and citizenship. Will they return, and if so, when? What label should we ascribe to the policies concerning their stay: "integration" or "social cohesion"? And are they on a pathway to Turkish citizenship? As these questions reveal, there is a general opacity and ambiguity regarding the presence of Syrians in Turkey. For this reason, the way that state actors perceive and frame (i.e. label and identify) long-term policies towards Syrians warrants further discussion. Thus, the arrival of Syrians in Turkey has opened a new era regarding the country's migratory landscape, migration policies and related debates.

Our aim in this research was to investigate the ways political institutions and actors are framing migration management by focusing on the terms used by the authorities in Turkey to discuss migration policies within this new era, largely by unpacking the discourse on "crisis". Interestingly, the word "crisis" has not even remotely been part of the public discourse on Syrians in the country. A country like Hungary, which granted international protection to 370 people in 2018, was in a "refugee crisis", while Turkey – with 3.6 million Syrians under a temporary protection regime, and another 100,000 (non-Syrians) seeking international protection – was not.[3.] This was a rather unexpected outcome. Unlike their European counterparts, especially the populist regimes in Europe, Turkish authorities have refrained from using the term "crisis". As Kirişci (2016: 1) has rightfully asserted, this refugee/migrant crisis was *Europe's crisis*. Europeans remain very puzzled about how it is possible that there is no crisis discourse to be found in Turkey despite the disproportionately high numbers. Indeed, how it can be so is something that the authors have been asked frequently during encounters with European colleagues, policymakers and journalists.[4.]

Our aim here is certainly not legitimizing the European discourse of "crisis", but to understand what is different in the Turkish discourse, why and how. In fact, the analyses of previous periods of migration management in Turkey[5.] show that the governance tradition is not very different from the European examples. In this article, we are interested first to show that Turkish authorities are refraining from using the term "crisis" through an analysis of reporting from the major news outlets and then try to explain why and how. The article proceeds as follows. We begin with providing a brief history of how the mass arrival of Syrians opened a new era in an old immigration country. The second section presents our methodology, which comprises two major components – thorough desktop research and an analysis of news reporting on Syrians. The third section reviews the recent literature on Syrians' media representation. This literature shows that the refugees are represented

in the media either as victims or threats in a highly politicized language. Thus, most of this work analyses what is present, and how refugees are portrayed. Yet, none focus on how the issue is framed overall, and what is absent as a discourse. This gap in the literature is filled with our findings in the fourth part; and the final section is the conclusion.

THE MASS ARRIVAL OF SYRIANS: A NEW ERA IN AN OLD IMMIGRATION COUNTRY

By the 1990s, Turkey had already become a hub for various migratory flows due to three simultaneous developments. The *first* was a result of the impact of the EU. The increasing externalization of the EU's immigration policies affected Turkey – an immediate neighbour bordering a complex Middle Eastern region – substantially. As the EU has increased its restrictive policies, for many migrants, Turkey has transformed from a country of transit to a country of a much longer transit or a country of voluntary or not-so-voluntary settlement (İçduygu and Yükseker, 2012: 441). *Second* can be grouped under a heading of regional and political developments. Although it might sound like a cliché, Turkey is at the crossroads of a turbulent region. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Turkey has witnessed a variety of forced migration flows, albeit with different policy reactions over time (Danış, Taraghi and Pérouse, 2009). The *third and final* aspect is internal Turkish dynamics. As Turkey's economic development has proceeded apace, it has become an attractive destination for labour migrants (Şaul, 2013).

Since our discussion here concerns mostly forced migration, we focus on Turkey's reception policies. Despite the diversification in the mix of immigrants and refugees over time, there was until very recently no clear-cut asylum or immigration policy in Turkey. It would be fair to argue that until the 2005 National Action Plan of Turkey for the Adoption of EU Acquis in the Field of Asylum and Migration, Turkey's policies reflected *ad hoc* solutions, characterized by temporariness, uncertainty, and arbitrariness. A major transformation came in 2013, when – as a result of the impact of the EU – the legal framework changed through the introduction of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection. Subsequently, the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM hereafter) under the Ministry of Interior was established in 2014, and the responsibility for enforcement and management shifted from the police to a dedicated public agency. Soykan (2012) argues that while these developments saw improvements in administrative and legal procedures, there have been serious defects in implementation of the law.

All these changes were happening during an extraordinary moment in Turkish immigration history. When the draft law was being discussed in the 2000s, the total number of foreigners in Turkey – including migrants and those in need of international protection – was much lower. To illustrate, in a 2013 dated report prepared for The Annual Meeting of the OECD Expert Group on Migration in Paris, İçduygu (2013: 18) estimates that "in 2001 over 258,000 foreign nationals were recorded as migrants in Turkey" and that "(f)rom the late 1990s to the early 2000s, Turkey received approximately 5,000 – 6,000 asylum applications a year" (2013: 20). As of September 2019, there were 3.65 *million* Syrians under the temporary protection regime (more than 98 per cent of them living in non-camp areas), 115,000 non-Syrian applicants for international protection and one million residence permit holders (of which 100,000 are Syrians) of various nationalities.[6.] Thus, the arrival of Syrians increased Turkey's foreign-born population substantially.

Until 2016, Turkey's government maintained a welcoming attitude towards Syrians with an open-door policy. Initially, Syrians were labelled as "guests" ("*misafir*" in Turkish), the direct connotation being that their stay would be temporary. This "guest" jargon continued even when the "Temporary Protection Directive" was issued in 2014. The category of "Temporary Protection

Status" that resulted, which has been granted to 3.65 million people, can be described as the Turkish way of defining refugee rights, based on ambiguity, uncertainty and unpredictable living conditions. As Danış and Nazlı (2019: 144) explain, Turkish authorities have identified and described the presence of Syrian refugees in the country as a temporary phenomenon and avoided using terms that indicate a permanent settlement in the country where the duration of temporariness has not been defined. At the same time, while it is never explicitly stated, for those seeking a permanent status in the country, there has been an implicit practice of engaging the concept of "deservingness", which seems to be related to being a bearer of capital – that is possessing significant economic[7.] or educational capital (Akçapar and Şimşek, 2018).

Partly as a result of these conditions, and partly as a consequence of the deteriorating environment in Syria, 2015 saw a spike in flows to Europe with 1,032,408 irregular arrivals in the Mediterranean region, the majority of them Syrian.[8.] To end irregular migration from Turkey to the EU, the parties signed the EU–Turkey Joint Action Plan.[9.] A subsequent EU-Turkey statement (2016), also referred as the so-called EU-Turkey "deal",[10.] entailed allocation of €3 billion under the EU's Facility for Refugees in Turkey, mainly to support humanitarian projects, a one-to-one resettlement program to promote orderly migration, and a visa liberalization roadmap aiming at lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens by June 2016.

Since then, the achievements of the EU–Turkey deal have been a controversial point of discussion. Throughout this whole process, refugees have become an instrument of diplomacy, a pragmatic way to maintain cordial relations with the EU and the West more generally. The visit of Chancellor Merkel of Germany to President Erdoğan in October 2015[11.] and of U2 lead singer and philanthropist Bono accompanying a delegation of U.S. senators and congressmen to a Syrian refugee camp in south-eastern Turkey's Gaziantep province[12.] in March 2016 are examples of how refugee reception has turned into an important tool of soft power for Turkey (Gökalp Aras and Şahin-Mencütek, 2016). Merkel's October 2015 visit to Turkey after a European Council meeting on management of the refugee crisis – coming just before Turkey's crucial November snap elections – was frequently mentioned as "a gift" by the media.[13.] Toygür and Benvenuti (2016: i) address how "Turkey was brought into the game and became a key partner in 'solving' the problem" of "the political and institutional stalemate" in the EU.

Three years after the EU–Turkey migration deal, many of the promises made to Turkey have not materialized. The "winner" – although without being able to stop the flows entirely – was clearly the EU. While crossings via the Aegean Sea to Europe have declined sharply, the number of Syrians resettled from Turkey to Europe based on the one-to-one formula has been very limited. This "success" for Europe has thus come at a heavy price. The deal, which has been harshly criticized by non-governmental organizations working in the field of refugee and immigrant rights, has meant that the EU waives its core values in order to protect its unity against the risk of disintegration in the face of the refugee crisis. Thus, Syrian refugees were prevented from going to European countries to seek asylum, which meant, as the crisis in Syria continues, there is neither a return option, nor the possibility of resettlement in a safe European country.

All this means that Syrian refugees are "now" permanently settling in Turkey (Danış, 2019). However, this will not be as easy as the government would wish. Since the first flows in 2011, the field and the conditions have been changing continuously. On the one hand, most Syrians' status remains to be guaranteed under a *temporary* protection regime, despite their extending duration of stay, and hinting at return still as a viable option. On the other hand, both the Turkish authorities and the civil society are engaging in further integration projects.[14.] Yet, one thing that is persistently constant is the continuing uncertainty and ambiguity where there are considerable variations in how the lives of refugees are directed and manipulated by the current forms of international and national refugee protection regimes, and how their lives are subject to a state of "permanent temporariness" (İçduygu, 2018; İçduygu and Sert, 2019).

METHOD

We have adopted a dual approach to investigate the discourse on migration management in Turkey. Besides thorough desktop research and an extensive literature review, we have also been inspired by the method of critical discourse analysis (hereafter CDA).[15] CDA perceives language as a form of social practice and consider the context of language as crucial, which cannot be separated from how we act and how we regulate our society. This context of language is where certain views are promoted and "naturalized" within a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) that shape and shaped by the discursive event (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258). Thus, discourse is both socially constitutive and conditioned on situations, objects of knowledge and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people, which is sustaining, reproducing and transforming (ibid.). Because discourse is so socially consequential, it raises important questions of power, producing and reproducing unequal power relations, with major ideological effects (ibid.). Generally, CDA studies focus on group relations of power and inequality and how these relations are reproduced and resisted against (Van Dijk, 2001; Wodak, 2013).

Thus, CDA scholars are interested in studying social phenomena, critically investigating these phenomena in order to challenge what is taken for granted, not only detailing linguistic features, but explaining the "whys and hows" (Milani, 2019). Critical approaches analyse the legitimacy of power through the media and examine the role of media news in producing social consent for various policies. Besides examining the formation of representations, discourse analysis also looks at the relations between representation, meaning and power, as well as the production of identities, and subjectivities. Frequently used in media studies, it is very important in revealing the implicit ideology that underpins the language forms used in the news. This critical method allows us to see not only what is present in the text, but also what is not – that is the absences and presuppositions, or what is revealed implicitly through what is made explicit (ibid.). As Wodak and Meyer, 2015: 3) also underlines:

> A good method is a method that is able to give satisfactory (reliable, relevant, etc.) answer to the questions of a research project. It depends on one's aims, expertise, time and goals and the kind of data that can or must be generated, that is on the context of a research project.[. . .] So there is not 'a' or 'one' method of CDA, but many.[. . .] So, please, no more 'I am going to apply CDA' because it does not make sense. Do critical discourse analysis by formulating critical goals, and then explain what specific explicit methods you want to realize it.

Accordingly, there are two subsequently defined goals of our research: *First* is to show whether the crisis discourse that is largely employed in Europe is used in Turkey. In order to generate data for this analysis, we elected to explore the discourse of the authorities on the Syrian issue and Syrians in Turkey as represented in the media. The texts we analysed were brought together from news reporting in national mass print media outlets.[16] We utilized the online databases of three major newspapers in Turkey – that is *Hürriyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, and *Sabah* – collecting news about Syrians and migration between May 2015 and May 2017. The choice of these three newspapers was based on their degree of proximity or distance from the government. *Hürriyet*, at least for the timeframe that we were interested in, was a rather mainstream newspaper, until it was bought by the Demirören Group in 2018.[17] *Cumhuriyet* has generally published opposition views, and *Sabah* has been pro-government since it was bought by the Çalık Group in 2008.[18]

We focused on the timeframe from May 2015 to May 2017 because this was when the "refugee crisis" discourse in Europe began (2015) and when it peaked (2017). Similarly, despite the fact that the steady increase in the number of Syrians has been filling the agenda of the Turkish policy makers and forming the public opinion earlier in 2013 and 2014, the humanitarian crisis following the

mass influx of migrants and asylum seekers from Turkey to Greece in the summer of 2015 has provoked a greater politicization of the topic in the country (Aksel and İçduygu, 2018). Using the keywords of Syrian, Syria, refugee, migration, migrant, and temporary protection to search newspapers' online databases, we have collected over 250 news articles for the given period. Among these, the term crisis was present in only 26 news articles that are analysed in detail in the results section.

The infrequency of the use of the term "crisis" in the generated data transpired our *second* goal of research, which is to explain why and how it is the case that there is an absence of a crisis discourse in Turkey. A recent study by Schröter and Taylor (2018: 1) has filled "a gap in the field of discourse studies by addressing the issue of silence and absence in discourses … While (critical) discourse analysis has been interested in the phenomena of absence (for example, hiding agency through the use of passive voice), little attention has been devoted to how we can systematically identify and analyse absences more broadly". Our aim is not to prioritize the European discourse of Syrian refugee crisis, but to present an attempt to fill a lacuna from a social science-based perspective, where we try to identify and analyse what is absent within the discourse on migration in Turkey and how this absence could be possible and materialized, which is a representation of the prevalent power relations. In order to make these power relationships visible, we also elucidate the social context, the strategies and devices that political elites employ.

The social context of the country has been complex: on the one hand, the state has engaged in an initial open-door and open arms policy towards the refugees as part of its foreign strategy of "precious loneliness". The term was introduced to international relations literature by İbrahim Kalın in 2013, the deputy undersecretary in charge of foreign policy for then prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, in order to describe the state of Turkey's Middle East policy.[19.] By adhering to its humanist values, Turkey did not remain silent to the problems of the Middle East, especially Syria, but was left in a "precious loneliness" by other countries that were indifferent towards the human suffering in the region. Within this context, Turkey's policies towards Syrians have been based on its civilizationist populist discourse that selectively extends the boundaries of "the people" in order to include the Syrians as part of the same *ummah*, which operates as a "hegemonic populism" through a discourse of brotherhood and references to a shared Ottoman legacy, as well as claims of moral superiority of Turkey over the West (Yanaşmayan et al., 2019: 48). These discursive devices of brotherhood, moral superiority, and anti-western stance, on the other hand, were being shaped alongside an increasing discomfort against the refugees in society and a background of rising competitive authoritarianism (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2016).

Similarly, Çınar (2018) argued, the government's populist and nativist discourse proposes to redefine Turkey as a Muslim nation by using a civilizational discourse, and thus, countering the Western civilization and secular lifestyles. With an ever-increasing dose of anti-Westernism, the government "has employed a civilizational discourse that aimed to redefine Turkey as a 'Muslim nation' that is supposedly freed from the contaminating [sic] effects of the hundreds of years of Westernization" (ibid.: 176). Examining the government's civilizational outlook vis-à-vis the West and its evolution as a discursive instrument, Çınar (2018) shows the government's Europeanizing drive in the first decade of 2000s and its later rejection of the Western hegemony together with its emphasis on Turkey's distinct civilizational identity, which should be seen "as instruments of justifying its extreme power orientation" (ibid.). A similar anti-Western policy rhetoric is also underlined by Göksel (2019) who, by using the 2017 Constitutional Referendum campaign as a case study, suggests that anti-Westernism is an effective discursive tool to consolidate illiberal populism and to garner domestic support in the elections. The media has served as an important platform to pursue this agenda.

SYRIANS IN TURKISH MEDIA: THE STATE OF THE ART

In the first four years, Syrian mass migration failed to garner significant attention either from the public or the media in Turkey (Erdoğan, 2015). Moreover, where there was coverage, local media focused on the effects of migration in specific parts of the country, with the national media generally hueing to the government line. As the media's interest in the issue grew over time, media representation of Syrians become a popular theme of research. A review of these studies reveals a somewhat controversial picture of the discourse. Like other examples of media representation of refugees and asylum seekers (Kaye, 2013), Syrian refugees in Turkey are generally depicted in national newspapers either as victims or threats. Pandır and Paksoy (2015) have provided an overview of the patterns of representation that were prominent in Turkish media coverage of asylum seekers. According to the authors, these patterns depicted refugees either as "victims in need of help", as people imprisoned in pain, sorrow and despair, as a "threat" and a "problem for the community in the source country", or linked to problems like violence and crime (ibid.: 1-26). Şenol Cantek and Soykan (2018: 1) also assessed the refugees' media representation in Turkey. In this study, migrants "were sometimes embraced with patronage and brotherhood discourse, sometimes ... seen as burdens, even criminalized ... according to the course of this policy, they were sometimes marked as victims and oppressed, sometimes as brothers and sometimes as forced guests". They also argued this guest and brother discourse increasingly transformed into one emphasizing the dangerous, unwanted foreigner who tramples on the rights of local people.

Based on an analysis of the period between 2011 and 2014, Doğanay and Çoban Keneş (2016) identified three types of discourse concerning Syrians in mainstream Turkish newspapers. A first frame presents them as "threats", a representation that often either criticizes government policies or blames the newcomers as an economic burden and security threat. A second frame "objectifies" the Syrian presence, accentuating the number of refugees arriving, the amount of money spent, and the amount of aid provided without mentioning the plight of refugees. A third type of discourse "sentimentalizes" the situation of Syrians, the conditions in which they live, and the public's reactions to their apparent "over-visibility" in cities. In a similar vein, Efe (2015), demonstrated four types of approach in terms of press discourse: focusing on the general problems of the refugees, emphasizing difficulties arising from the refugee presence in Turkey, politicizing Syrian news, and foregrounding border security (also see Efe et al. 2018).

Analyses of local media also point out the negative discourse against refugees. Examining three local newspapers in Trabzon with different ideological views, Bayram (2016) concluded that a common marginalizing language prevails and found that a news discourse developed around asylum seekers that cast them as a potential threat to the social, cultural and economic structure of the city. Focusing on the local press in the province of Eskişehir, Göktuna Yaylacı (2017) also found a media discourse against refugees that reflected a confluence of several factors, including ethnic grouping, internal political polarization, and socio-economic problems, for which they were cast as "scapegoats".

Another significant theme in the domain of media representation is the politicization of the refugee issue. Atasü-Topçuoğlu (2019) argues that the current political polarization in Turkey affects the public's willingness to accept the presence of Syrians. Consequently, the metaphors and arguments used in Turkish newspapers differ according to ideological position. As she argues,

> All newspapers partly challenge the selective acceptance principle in terms of paramount criteria of acceptance. *Yeni Akit*, representing the far right, supports Sunni Muslim identity as the paramount selection criterion and as the integration basis for mass naturalization policy. *Cumhuriyet*, representing the social-democrat Kemalist ideology, emphasizes cultural resemblance, strongly rejects religious similarity for acceptance and supports refugee status. *Sol Portal*, representing the socialist ideology, rejects both ethnic and religious criteria. *Hürriyet*, representing the center-right ideology,

> keeps ethnic or religious identity out of the discussion, hence silently rejecting principle, and strongly opposing mass naturalization. (ibid: 294)[20.]

She concludes that each ideological stance accepted Syrians on a selective basis, implying that the blanket offer of a pathway to Turkish citizenship for Syrians was not welcome.

Also underlining that news agencies are not "ideologically neutral sources", Sunata and Yıldız (2018: 148) depicted that "(a)s a mouthpiece of the Turkish government" Anadolu Agency (AA) mostly covered refugee policy-related news from a humanitarian perspective, preferring to talk of refugees as humanitarian aid receivers while emphasizing religious unity. Similarly, Yavçan et. al. (2017) argues, while "Turkish government's 'pro-refugee strategy' caused pro-government newspapers to portray Syrian refugees as 'victimized guests' within a religious reference of Ensar–Muhacir dichotomy instead of a rights-based approach, anti-government newspapers mostly hold an anti-Syrian position by emphasizing their financial burden on the country". Yanaşmayan et al. (2019: 38) also demonstrate "the absence (or silencing) of rights-based discourses recognizing existing ethnic and religious diversity in Turkey".

Refugee representation in television news shows that the discourse structures used were transformed into a dominant discourse across society and that refugees emerged as anchoring motifs in internal political debates in a way that reflected the media organs' ideological outlooks (Boztepe, 2017). According to Çağlar and Özkır (2015), newspaper reporting and columns have become highly politicized. On the one hand, some newspapers produce negative news about refugees simply as a lever to oppose the government. On the other, those outlets that are ideologically closer to the government produce news with either refugee-friendly content and discourse, or news that focuses on legitimizing Turkey's foreign policy as either humanitarian or high-minded.

Göker and Keskin (2016) apply both content and discourse analyses to a wide range of newspapers of diverse ideological stances. In so doing, the authors note that while newspapers' use of different contexts reflects political attitudes and the news content produced on Syrian refugees can be related mainly to political orientations, one common theme is representation of Syrians as source of negativity. In other words, Syrian refugees are almost always represented first and foremost as a "problem", regardless of what underlying source or cause is identified by a given outlet (i.e. whether the refugees themselves are the problem or problems arise as a product of other circumstances). A similar conclusion can be read from the monitoring report of news coverage on refugees and migration in the national and local media that focused on the period from June 2017 to November 2018 (İGAM, 2019). The report notes that

> In both the newspapers and television news reports, the refugees and immigrants have been attributed more 'newsworthy' when it comes to dramatic incidents and tragedies. This situation causes the refugees to find a predominant place in especially the television news reports with violence, criminal acts, dramatic stories, or accidents on migratory routes. (İGAM, 2019: 113)

Thus, the existing literature on the representation of refugees in the media reiterates that there are refugee-related "problems" in Turkey. Our own findings concur. These are either problems of refugees, or problems that are caused by the refugees, which are portrayed differently based on the ideological position of the media outlet. Yet, despite this negative portrayal of refugees, what is striking is the absence of (refugee) crisis discourse in Turkey, as we discuss in the next section.

RESULTS

While most previous studies depict negative representation as a common underlying media theme, the literature does not refer whatsoever to crisis discourse. While these studies rightly highlight the

ideological instrumentalization of language deployed explicitly, they all fail to acknowledge the importance of the language that is absent. As emphasized in the discussion on critical discourse analysis, it is vital to focus not only on the what is present in a text but what is missing from it – what is in fact "not said" and what this might signify. We need, in other words, to acknowledge that absences contribute to the meaning of what is present.

Our investigation shows that discourse of the authorities in Turkey on Syrians is not referring to the issue as a "crisis". As stated earlier, out of more than 250 news articles collected for data generation, the word "crisis" was expressed only in 26 of them, which can be classified in four categories. The *first* is when a speaker or a representative from the EU gives a public briefing in Turkey and is cited by the press. There are 11 such news articles. The *second* category consists of the use of crisis in reference to the crisis in Syria or humanitarian crisis (three news articles). The *third* is unrelated phrasing of the word such as economic crisis, food crisis, etc. (three news articles). The *final,* and the relevant category for our purposes, comprised those instances where the expression is used by the politicians in Turkey. There are nine such news articles, where both the government (eight) and the opposition (one) express "crisis". In the single occasion where the opposition conveys the word, it is openly criticizing the government policies regarding the refugees. In the eight news articles[21.] where the government refers to "crisis", the indication is always the "crisis in Europe", and Turkey is presented as an important stakeholder for a solution. As the highest figure in government, President Erdoğan is quoted in four – (1) on his way to a meeting at the UN General Assembly, (2) in an interview at a Russian TV channel, (3) on a phone call with then French President Hollande, and (4) during a state visit to Belgium upon the invitation of King Philippe – thus, always targeting a foreign audience.[22.]

The particular labelling as crisis depends on the political context and upon the circumstances governing the dispute. We argue that the political nature of this framing and discourse is a result of two practices in Turkey: the deliberate choices of the political elite and strong media control. There is an emerging ambiguity in migration management in Turkey, where authorities seem to be unwilling to change. As argued by Lowndes and Polat (2018) this ambiguity is usually present because it suits the authorities' interests.

Our desktop research shows that one area of ambiguity is the numbers. To illustrate, in a press briefing in Antalya in 2018, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlut Çavuşoğlu answered a question about the number of Syrians receiving citizenship by saying the figure was "unknown", while reporting the number of Syrians returning to Syria after Operation Euphrates Shield with a precise number of "more than 170,000".[23.] This single narrative illustrates how government representatives can manipulate facts – usually playing an unfair numbers game – providing information that serves the government's interests or fits its policies and obscuring information that does not. Similarly, Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu's statements in 2019 that 329,000 Syrians had returned "as Turkey successfully completed counter-terror operations in northern Syria"[24.] also illustrates how numbers magically become transparent and specific when it suits the government. A similar policy of number transparency was also pursued during the events following the opening of the border in Edirne in late February 2020, when the Minister provided exact numbers of border crossers on Twitter every day in ten thousands.[25.] These numbers were confirmed neither by the organizations active in the field nor by the Greek side.

Besides numbers, this ambiguity is also reflected in the way authorities deploy a dual discourse on the crisis, depending on the audience. We see that Turkey refers to a refugee crisis when the audience is from Europe since crisis discourse allows the importance of "burden-sharing" to be foregrounded. The news and columns covering President Erdoğan's phone call with France's former President François Hollande,[26.] or President Erdoğan's visit to King Philip of Belgium,[27.] refer to a "refugee crisis in Europe" the burden of which Turkey should not have to bear alone. Similarly, in 2016, EU Minister Ömer Çelik stressed: "the refugee crisis is one of the biggest crises that the global system faces, and the EU can only manage this crisis in cooperation with Turkey".[28.]

The minister's statement thus reveals that while the crisis is global, Turkey is simultaneously immune and part of the solution. News covering the EU–Turkey deal also has a similar stance, referring to Europe's refugee crisis for which Turkey has been forced to the rescue.[29.]

Again in 2016, during a speech at the "Common Action Forum", Turkey's ambassador to Madrid Ömer Önhon stated, "unless European Union countries change their policies regarding asylum, crisis can grow further… Turkey, since the first day of the crisis in Syria, opened its doors to asylum seekers regardless of religion, race, [and] language differences. Currently, more than 2.8 million Syrians are living in Turkey. It is our humanitarian obligation to accept asylum seekers".[30.] Önhon's statements refer to an asylum crisis in Europe and a crisis in Syria. There is no reference to a crisis in Turkey, just an act of benevolence.

In 2017, recalling that the DGMM was established under the auspices of the interior ministry, its head – Süleyman Soylu – stated that Turkey's firm legal and institutional responses to the increased human mobility as a result of Syria crisis set an example to the world. He asserted:

> Turkey has not turned anyone away at the door. It did not send people back in the direction of the bullets and bombs that were behind them. While laying the institutional groundwork, it did not allow great weaknesses or conflicts either socially or security-wise. This was not an easy task. There are still 3,551,078 people in Turkey staying as migrants—refugees. Based on data from AFAD, the total amount of expenditure of Turkish public institutions, civil society organizations, and the general public on refugees during the Syria crisis is 25 billion dollars. Turkey has been fighting terrorism while doing this. It fought the PKK, the PYD, FETÖ, DEAŞ. It survived elections. It survived coup attempts. It has been subjected to economic sabotage. [from abroad][31.]

Yet, despite listing these hardships, the Interior Minister did not mention any "crisis" in Turkey. Unlike in European discourses, the word "crisis" is entirely absent.

The leadership of Turkey's major opposition party, the CHP, took a different approach. Contrary to the government, members of the opposition used the expression "refugee crisis" openly and often. In 2016, the CHP's vice president Veli Ağbaba stated, "Turkey, with 3 million people, has become the country that hosts the largest number of refugees in the world, and the reason the refugee crisis has deepened so much is the wrong and short-sighted Syria policy that the AKP has followed".[32.]

When we turn our attention to government discourse, we see it is explicitly anti-Western. Recording the fact that Turkey has done its part on the migration issue both in a humanitarian and a legal sense, Minister Soylu said:

> The total number of Syrian asylum applications accepted in all European Union countries is 866,831 people. The number of individuals hosted by Turkey is 3.3 times greater than this. If we look at the proportions, the total EU population is 500 million, while Turkey's is 80 million. In some countries, senior officials have clearly stated that measures must be taken against refugee flows via walls, thermal cameras, and razor wire. Again, in one European country, 89.2 per cent of the asylum seekers were exposed to police violence. Again, in one European country, asylum seekers were forced to take showers in barrels at minus 10 degrees Celsius…. Akif [referring to the poet–author of Turkey's national anthem] said it beautifully, 'Civilization is a monster with a single tooth.' Yet, I guess even Akif did not think it would go so far.[33.]

President Erdoğan has expressed similar sentiments as reported in this clip from *Sabah*:

> Stating that Europe is a common source of refugee deaths, Erdoğan recalled little Aylan, whose body was seen lying on the shore in Bodrum: 'Will humanity not pay the price for the death of this three-year-old child?' Claiming that the photo had brought him to tears, Erdoğan answered the question 'who is guilty' by stating, 'I actually find the whole Western world guilty in this regard. The Western-centred world is behind us; the new world is multi-centred. The Western countries

> that set the criteria of freedom after World War II, unfortunately, are now turning their backs on these values. It is not only refugees who are drowning in the Mediterranean—our very humanity is drowning in the Mediterranean. The values that make us who we are have drowned in the Mediterranean. Every refugee left to their fate at the gates of Europe, or even deliberately sunk in their boats—left to die—reflects this very reality.[34.]

Especially towards domestic audiences, we see a constant blame game against the West.

Moreover, there is no crisis discourse, since it is in the interest of the government to present the situation inside Turkey as if everything is under control. "Control" thus becomes a recurrent implicit theme within the discourse, which is, in fact, evident in the field. For example, in the initial years of the influx from Syria – due to capacity deficiencies in Turkey in the face of such large numbers of arrivals – the authorities were more willing to cooperate with international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). In time, these INGOs have come under greater pressure. Those organizations that were not willing to operate under the terms of the central authority have been excluded from the system, which we argue is evidence of the attempt to mandate control. Either their permits were not renewed, and they were banned from operating altogether (e.g. the Mercy Corps,[35.] the Medical Corps[36.]); or they were renewed but for a very short period of time (e.g. Save the Children); or – in some cases – their international funds could not be transferred due to bureaucratic obstacles (e.g. Women Now for Development). There have also been national organizations, such as International Middle East Peace Research Centre (IMPR), whose operations were shut down by the Turkish authorities in early 2017 without any public explanation.[37.]

Meanwhile, local and international actors that are willing to cooperate or to play the "subcontracting" role (Mackreath and Sağnıç, 2017; Woods and Kayalı, 2017) are supported and endorsed by the central authority (Danış and Nazlı, 2019). Despite the short-term increase in the number of humanitarian organizations in the aftermath of the refugee crisis, the state's re-establishment of control over civil society after 2016 reiterates the longstanding centralizing posture of the Turkish state.

Increased state intervention and control have also borne on the field of migration research. The letter sent by the Ministry of Interior to the rectors' offices in April 2015 on the need for approval for research conducted on Syrians is but one example of increasing authoritarianism in Turkey. Although it was later announced that the provision requiring researchers to obtain advance permission from the DGMM to conduct interviews and surveys with Syrian refugees had been rescinded, no official word was ever sent to rectors' offices, and there remains (we argue, *deliberate*) ambiguity as to whether permission is required or not. It would not be wrong to say that this uncertainty sometimes turns into arbitrary barriers for those who want to undertake academic research.

Mechanisms of control manifest most clearly concerning the media – and on many levels. On the macro level, control of the mainstream national media is evident, a result of changes in ownership where pro-government families have been given precedence. Media control in Turkey is not unique to coverage on Syrians. The government has been successful in streamlining the mainstream media by building a pro-government media bloc, where private media outlets with close ties to the government undermined the opposition's access to media (Esen and Gümüşcü, 2016). Looking at the headlines of major newspapers after the then prime minister Erdoğan's visit to Egypt in August 2013,[38.] or before the 10 February 2017 referendum[39.] show the deplorable pandering of the mass media in Turkey. Against the arguments that having the same headline in ten different newspapers can be attributed to the use of the same news agency, we can also look at the columns on 5 March 2015 with the same heading about the so-called Kabataş attack during the Gezi protests.[40.] Different political stances among news agencies are indeed effectual, where news agencies' ideologies provide self-consistent pictures and create compact resources for newspaper partisanship; thus, the refugee representation dynamics are all related to the ideologies and political stances of the news agencies (Sunata and Yıldız, 2018: 148).

There are also indications showing that on the micro (i.e. local) level, journalists are also barred from reporting news that might increase anti-migrant sentiments among the local population. A local journalist in Urfa,[41.] commenting just after clashes between Syrians and Turks there in September 2018,[42.] suggests this is sometimes a case of self-censorship by the local press. Urfa is one of the border cities that hosts many Syrians. Although the incidents saw a state of emergency declared in the city, there was almost no national media coverage and only limited local press attention.[43.] Similarly, a journalist from a major newspaper in Istanbul stated that they were asked not to report news about refugees and migrants after the 2019 local elections. The officials do not want the public to develop the impression that things are out of control; therefore, especially when things are factually out of control, they choose not to share information with the public. Thus, the discourse that the "Syrian issue is under control" is being reiterated by the media on all levels (Kovucu, 2016).

CONCLUSION

For Europe, the increase in irregular crossings of Syrian asylum seekers via the Aegean Sea has been defined as a refugee "crisis". A similar "crisis" discourse is not evidently visible in Turkey. The existing literature on the representation of refugees in the media, reiterates that there are refugee-related "problems" either as problems of refugees, or problems that are caused by the refugees, but there is "no [refugee] crisis" in Turkey. Our data show that from May 2015 to May 2017, of more than 250 news articles about Syria and migration in general, the word "crisis" was spelled out only in 26 either with reference to crisis in Syria, to humanitarian crisis, or to Europe's refugee crisis where Turkey is the solution key. It is only in rare instances when the opposition is cited in the news that there is a reference to a refugee crisis.

We discuss that this discursive practice about the refugee issue is impacted by the government's discourse characterized by its anti-western and Islamic civilizational superiority undertones. The government in Turkey differentiates itself from its European counterparts by a discourse of moral superiority over the West. The reason behind this ideological move is to prove the civilizational and moral superiority of Turkish culture of hospitality vis-à-vis the anti-immigrant West (as also argued by Yanaşmayan et al., 2019) as a strategy to criticize and counter the Western model. The strategy works both as a foreign policy tool as well as generating domestic support.

What are some of the policy implications of this ideological discourse in domestic politics? We identify two major ones: *first*, "no crisis" means everything is "under control", a stance that is reinforced by increasing controls on different stakeholders, that is the media, academics, researchers and INGOs and *second*, the ambiguous tone of political elites as explained here leaves a space for manoeuvre in policymaking, especially an agenda setting power, which is mostly pragmatic. In such an environment, having an open and transparent public debate and free media become exceptionally valid and essential.

NOTES

1. An early draft of this article was presented in October 2018 during a workshop in Istanbul on "The Framing of the 'Migration Crisis' Cross-Nationally: From Problem Definition to Institutionalization (Or Not)." At the beginning of the research, our focus was twofold: exploring the discourse on "integration" and unpacking the discourse on "crisis". Concerning the first, our examination of the discourse on "integration" between 2015 and 2019 – when Turkish state authorities began to acknowledge that Syrians were permanently settling in the country – revealed that integration had become an essential policy requirement. This was partly a result of changes in EU–Turkey relations, which we also discuss in this article. However, the

authorities seemed reluctant to adopt the term "integration", which is perceived in Turkey – based on the historical experience of Turkish emigrants to European countries – as a metaphor for the assimilationist approach prevailing in Europe. Thus, the leading public agencies, such as the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), employed the phrase "social cohesion" or "harmonization" ("uyum" in Turkish) in place of "integration". This choice of words reflects the way Turkish authorities sought to frame the debate, as well as longer-standing views on the Turkish side about how European governments seek to "assimilate" their immigrant populations; they also reflect the government's desire to foreground Turkey's apparent Ottoman heritage of hospitality and peaceful co-existence (Kloos, 2016: 536).

2. The quotation marks are kept as they were originally used in the articles cited by Koca. We read the usage of quotation marks as a critical stance against the claims that Turkey has been following a liberal, humanitarian policy; former understood as open, latter understood as seeking to promote human welfare.
3. For the numbers in Hungary, please visit the official website of the Asylum Information Database (aida) at https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/hungary/statistics (accessed on 15 June 2019); for the numbers in Turkey, please visit the official website of the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) at https://www.goc.gov.tr (Accessed on 15 June 2019).
4. The fact that there is not a crisis discourse in Turkey does not mean that there is a total harmony in the country with regard to the relations between the locals and refugees and/or immigrants and that everything is great; the 2019 local elections, the following public polls and the opening of the border in Edirne in late February 2020 have all shown the opposite.
5. For example, see Sert and Yıldız, 2016.
6. There were also 225,000 apprehensions of irregular migrants, which is an important indicator of this type of mobility. For the official statistics, please visit DGMM website at https://www.goc.gov.tr, accessed on 2 September 2019. Additionally, based on a statement made by the Ministry of Interior, as of 2 August 2019, there are 92,000 Syrians who were granted Turkish citizenship, of this number, 47,000 are adults, and 45,000 are children (https://t24.com.tr/haber/suleyman-soylu-vatandaslik-verilen-suriyelilerin-sayisini-acikladi,833262).
7. This new practice of deservingness is rather different than in the past, where incorporation and inclusion were largely related to one's ethnic or religious origin ("soydaş" or "din kardeşi") (Danış and Parla, 2009). For example, those foreigners who buy property or make an investment in Turkey are granted the possibility of obtaining Turkish citizenship. Recently, there has been revision to the law. It was declared in the Official Gazette published on 09/19/2018 that Decision 106 changed some regulations related to naturalization and acquiring of citizenship. Accordingly, the envisaged fixed amount of capital to qualify for citizenship of Turkey was reduced from USD2 million to 500,000. Similarly, for those foreign real estate owners in Turkey who seek naturalization the minimum real estate prices decreased from USD 1 million to 250,000. Moreover, the citizenship eligibility requirement of providing employment for at least 100 people was changed to 50. The amount of deposits that must be kept in banks in Turkey to earn the right to acquire citizenship was decreased from USD3 million to 500,000.
8. Based on data provided by the UNHCR at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean (accessed on 2 September 2019).
9. For the formal text of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, please visit: at https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5860_en.htm (accessed on 2 September 2019).
10. For the statement, please visit: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/ (accessed on 9 March 2020). For a detailed legal analysis, see Övünç Öztürk & Soykan (2019) .
11. https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/35684/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-almanya-basbakani-merkeli-kabul-etti (accessed on 2 September 2019).
12. https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2016/04/02/u2s-bono-us-senators-visit-refugees-in-turkeys-seastern-gaziantep-province (accessed on 2 September 2019).
13. https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-eu-34569620 (accessed on 12 September 2019).
14. While the government acclaims return of Syrians (see for example "Turkish vice president says Turkey puts all basic services into use of Syrians going back to their homeland" at https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkey-370-000-syrians-return-to-terror-free-areas/1655713, accessed 9 May 2020), it has also accepted a strategy document on social cohesion (which has not been publicly shared) and de facto integration is happening (see for example "Despite talk of returns, Turkey quietly works to integrate Syrian refugees" at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-turkey-insight/despite-talk-of-returns-turkey-quietly-works-to-integrate-syrian-refugees-idUSKCN1RA0G7 accessed 9 May 2020).
15. We also have frequent correspondence with journalists in the field. These are mostly informal information exchanges, when journalists seek academic expertise given the popularity of the subject.

16. A better methodology to analyse the discourse of authorities in Turkey could be to conduct face-to-face interviews with different stakeholders, mainly bureaucrats and politicians. Yet, given the political context in Turkey, especially after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt, these actors have become rather inaccessible to researchers. Also, we believe that the adopted research method is significantly appropriate for the focused research, with some important advantages in comparison with face-to-face interviews, because even without the coup attempt, to have access to high-level bureaucrats would be difficult. Furthermore, different from many other countries, in Turkey, the government does not use its formal channels such as the official websites for public communication, but mainly the media.
17. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dogan-holding-m-a-demiroren/pro-erdogan-group-agrees-to-buy-owner-of-hurriyet-newspaper-cnn-turk-idUSKBN1GX23R (accessed on 2 September 2019).
18. https://www.cnnturk.com/2008/ekonomi/sirketler/02/07/atv.sabah.calik.grubuna.gidiyor/426548.0/index.html (accessed on 2 September 2019).
19. See Murat Yetkin's analysis "The end of Turkey's 'precious loneliness'?" at https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/murat-yetkin/the-end-of-turkeys-precious-loneliness-100622 (dated 18 June 2016, accessed on 9 May 2020).
20. It is important to note that Atasü-Topçuoğlu (2019) presents Hurriyet as a "centre-right" newspaper. Here, we categorize Hürriyet before 2018 as "mainstream" in comparison with the other two major newspapers in Turkey, that is Sabah being pro-government and Cumhuriyet being opposition. Our categorization is not along left-right spectrum, but along advocacy lines.
21. Of eight news articles while Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, EU Minister Ömer Çelik, and the Ambassador of Madrid each use the word crisis once, President Erdoğan is cited in four.
22. Of eight news articles where the government use the word crisis, the audience is domestic only once, when the Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu spoke.
23. https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/disisleri-bakani-cavusoglu-suriyeli-vatandasligi-varsa-oy-kullanabilecek-368350.html (accessed on 2 September 2019).
24. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/-329-000-syrians-returned-home-in-wake-of-turkish-ops-/1489532 (accessed on 2 September 2019).
25. https://www.haberturk.com/icisleri-bakani-soylu-edirne-uzerinden-36-bin-776-gocmen-ayrildi-2599528 (accessed on 9 May 2020).
26. https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/09/04/akdenizde-bogulan-multeci-degil-insanlik (dated 4 September 2015, accessed on 12 September 2019).
27. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/turkiyeyi-ornek-alin-30242323 (dated 5 October 2015, accessed 12 September 2019).
28. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/ab-bakani-celikten-cok-onemli-vize-aciklamasi-40253061 (dated 19 October 2016, accessed on 12 September 2019).
29. https://www.sabah.com.tr/fotohaber/dunya/ab-turkiye-anlasmasi-ne-olacak (dated 14 May 2016, accessed on 12 September 2019).
30. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/buyukelcisi-onhon-avrupanin-siginmacilarla-ilgili-politikasi-basarisiz-40269803 (dated 6 November 2016, accessed on 2 September 2019).
31. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/suleyman-soylu-turkiyede-bugun-halen-gocmen-40366711 (dated 15 February 2017, accessed on 12 September 2019).
32. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/554372/CHP_den_carpici_multeci_raporu.html (dated 20 June 2016, accessed on 12 September 2019).
33. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/suleyman-soylu-turkiyede-bugun-halen-gocmen-40366711
34. https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/09/04/akdenizde-bogulan-multeci-degil-insanlik
35. Sanchez, R. (2017) "Turkey forces aid group Mercy Corps to shut down its operations", The Telegraph, 3 August 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/08/turkey-forces-aid-group-mercy-corps-shut-operations (accessed on 2 September 2019).
36. DeYoung, K., & Fahim, K. (2016) "Turkey deports foreigners working with Syrian refugees", The Washington Post, 26 April 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/turkey-arrests-more-than-1000-suspected-followers-of-us-based-cleric/2017/04/26/dfa33540-2a6c-11e7-86b7-5d31b5fdc114_story.html?utm_term=.fe70c8ec48e3 (accessed on 2 September 2019).
37. https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/gundem/calisma-bakaninin-sertifika-dagittigi-dernek-fetocu-cikti-1846906/
38. Bir Musa Çıkar Hesabını Sorar (A Moses Comes and Calls to Account).
39. Prangaları Söküyoruz (We are Removing the Shackles).
40. Diliniz Kaba Vicdanınız Taş (Your Language is Rough; Your Conscience is Stone).

41. Face to face interview with a local journalist in Urfa, 24 October 2018.
42. See governor's statement at: http://www.harranajans.com/haberdetay/HUZUR-VE-GUVEN-ORTAMINI-BOZMAYA-CALISANLARA-MUSAMAHA-GOSTERILMEYECEK/12988 (accessed on 2 September 2019).
43. For example, Hürriyet only shared it as local news: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yerel-haberler/sanliurfa/sanli urfada-suriyeli-gerginligi-2-40971906 (accessed on 2 September 2019).

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